SCOTUS: IP Cases in the Pipeline

by Dennis Crouch

The Supreme Court is hearing argument in Hikma Pharmaceuticals USA Inc. v. Amarin Pharma, Inc., No. 24-889 on April 29, 2026 (as I write this). Hikma is the only granted patent case of the term.  But I wanted to step back and take stock of the IP pipeline at the Court. I identified twelve cases are now pending at various stages before the Supreme Court, including several pre-petition applications.

Patent Eligibility (§ 101): The most familiar question on the docket is whether the Court will revisit § 101.  And two cases are pending:

United Services Automobile Association v. PNC Bank N.A., No. 25-853. USAA’s mobile check-deposit patents were invalidated as abstract-ideas, with the Federal Circuit concluding that the inventions were too functional rather than being directed to improvements in computer functionality itself. The petition asks (1) whether the Federal Circuit has improperly extended the abstract-idea exception to encompass concrete technological processes, and (2) whether computer-implemented inventions must improve computer functionality to be eligible. AIPLA filed an amicus brief arguing that Alice step two has effectively reconstituted the pre-1952 “invention” requirement that Judge Rich’s drafting of 35 U.S.C. § 103 was meant to eliminate. See Dennis Crouch, AIPLA Argues Alice Has Conflated Eligibility With Patentability, Patently-O (Mar. 10, 2026). The case has been redistributed for the May 14, 2026 conference.

A second § 101 petition, Rideshare Displays, Inc. v. Lyft, Inc., No. 25-1132, asks whether the Federal Circuit improperly ignored functional limitations during eligibility analysis. Rideshare pairs that issue with a second question: the Federal Circuit, it contends, decided a written-description issue sua sponte without giving the PTAB an opportunity to address it in the first instance, a Chenery problem. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943) (holding that a reviewing court must judge the propriety of agency action solely on the grounds invoked by the agency itself, and may not affirm on a rationale the agency never considered).

The Federal Circuit’s Jury and Procedural Practices

I put together a second cluster focusing on the Federal Circuit’s procedural practice on appeal, both from district courts and from the PTAB.  These are all “shortcut” cases.

Two Expert / Seventh Amendment petitions: Finesse Wireless LLC v. AT&T Mobility LLC, No. 25-953, asks whether the Federal Circuit improperly invaded the jury’s province by reweighing expert testimony to grant JMOL. The Court requested a response from AT&T and Ericsson that will be filed in May. See Dennis Crouch, Finesse Wireless Asks the Supreme Court to Restore the Jury’s Role in Patent Cases, Patently-O (Feb. 11, 2026). Sunoco Partners Marketing & Terminals L.P. v. Powder Springs Logistics, LLC, No. 25A1126, currently an extension application, presents the same themes of FRE 702, de novo review, and the Seventh Amendment in patent cases. Sunoco’s actual petition also due in May.

CAO Lighting, Inc. v. Wolfspeed, Inc., No. 25-1068, raises the Rule 36 issue – arguing that the Federal Circuit’s practice of no-opinion judgments of PTO appeals cannot be reconciled with three independent legal sources:

35 U.S.C. § 144 (which requires the court to issue “its mandate and opinion” on appeals from the PTO);
The APA’s requirement of de novo review of legal questions; and
Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024), which requires … independent review by the judiciary.

The case has been distributed for the May 14, 2026 conference.

PTO Authority and IPR Procedure

Three pending cases challenge USPTO authority:

Hyatt v. Squires, No. 25-1049, asks whether the PTO may invoke prosecution laches to deny pending patent applications — even where the applicant has complied with all statutory timing requirements. The petition frames this along the lines of SCA Hygiene and Petrella, arguing that the Patent Act contains comprehensive timing provisions, leaving no gap for an equitable doctrine to fill.  A response is due from the USPTO in early May. See Dennis Crouch, Patently Unreasonable: Hyatt’s Return to the Supreme Court and the Fight Over Prosecution Laches, Patently-O (Mar. 6, 2026).

Dolby Laboratories Licensing Corporation v. Unified Patents, LLC, No. 25-1011, revives the long-running real-parties-in-interest (RPI) dispute. The PTAB declined to require IPR petitioner Unified to identify its members, and the Federal Circuit subsequently dismissed Dolby’s appeal on standing grounds and held that 35 U.S.C. § 314(d) bars review of RPI determinations. See Dennis Crouch, Dolby Petitions the Supreme Court on Informational Standing and IPR Real Parties in Interest, Patently-O (Feb. 26, 2026).  In a new decision this week, the CAFC doubled down on its approach. See FedEx v. Qualcomm.

Finally, in Google LLC v. VirtaMove, Corp., Google challenges the USPTO’s expanded discretionary review procedures – particularly the “settled expectations” doctrine that was created whole cloth in 2025. Google’s petition argues, like Hyatt’s, that the agency has invented a non-statutory limitations period. See Dennis Crouch, The Director’s Non-Statutory Statute of Limitations, Patently-O (Apr. 27, 2026).

Trade Secret Damages and Procedure

The Defend Trade Secrets Act, enacted in 2016, has finally generated a critical mass of cert petitions. The Court has yet to interpret the statute, and three pending matters could change that. Tata Consultancy Services Limited v. Computer Sciences Corporation, No. 25-1107, presents two questions: (1) whether the DTSA permits unjust-enrichment recoveries when the plaintiff has already been made whole by actual damages, and (2) whether punitive damages exceeding a 1:1 ratio with substantial compensatory damages comport with State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003). Responsive brief is due May 7.

Medallia, Inc. v. EchoSpan, Inc., No. 25A1094, currently an extension application, asks whether the DTSA requires courts to apportion damages on a secret-by-secret basis or whether plaintiffs may recover lump-sum awards based on holistic theories. Finally, Chaturvedi v. Bridge Over Corporation, No. 25-1174, asks whether the DTSA preempts a state-court order compelling public disclosure of asserted trade secrets. The case arose from Massachusetts state court proceedings.

Lanham Act and Copyright

Finally, I’ll highlight two non-patent matters:

CareDx, Inc. v. Natera, Inc., No. 25-959, is a Lanham Act false-advertising case. The Third Circuit held that even after a jury found Natera’s comparative campaign deliberately false, CareDx had failed to prove consumer deception and reliance. The petition argues that the Third Circuit now stands alone in barring an inference of deception from a jury finding of deliberate falsity.  The case is well-positioned for a CVSG.

BMG Rights Management (US) LLC v. Vetter, No. 25A1109, is an extension application. The forthcoming petition will challenge a Fifth Circuit holding that Copyright termination provisions of 17 U.S.C. §§ 203 and 304 reach worldwide rights granted under a worldwide assignment. The petition is due May 13, 2026.