Magnifica Humanitas, AI, and the State

The encyclical Magnifica Humanitas by Pope Leo XIV is a remarkable text in many ways. It recognizes the dangers of technological concentration and the threat that large private platforms pose to human dignity. The text warns of “social control made possible by the massive collection of data and use of algorithmic systems” and speaks of “the architecture of visibility.” However, it has a blind spot: it does not dare to name states as possible architects of these surveillance structures.

This is astonishing when we consider that history shows us time and again that it is always the state that is the greatest opponent of individual freedoms. The market has its flaws, certainly, but it has the irreplaceable virtue of dispersing power. The state, on the other hand, concentrates it. And concentrating power is, by nature, the greatest threat to individual freedoms.

So what does the encyclical do? Worse than ignoring the danger of the state, it calls on public authorities to regulate, to set the rules. It falls into the trap of believing that the political realm is immune to the flaws that plague individuals in the market: fallibility, weakness, corruptibility. As if the legislator were suddenly exempt from his own human condition.

True humility, the kind the encyclical itself calls for, would consist in accepting that humans are human, and that their qualities and flaws are distributed among all individuals without exception. And this humility leads to an irrefutable logical deduction: if the regulator is also fallible and corruptible, then centralized regulation is dangerous by its very nature. It merely shifts the problem of power concentration, or rather, it worsens it, because it makes that concentration legal and permanent, backed by the full coercive force of the state.

The true response to technological concentration is not state-based; it is subsidiarity. The encyclical itself reminds us of this by calling for the humanization of technology by individuals, communities, and intermediary bodies. This is a central and essential point, perhaps the only possible response to the issues raised by the encyclical. This reminder of the principle of subsidiarity may well be the most important passage of the text.

The encyclical itself emphasizes this point:

If every woman and man is called to take ownership of his or her own life and to contribute to the formation of society, then social institutions must also respect and support this responsibility. The Social Doctrine of the Church refers to subsidiarity as the principle according to which the role of individuals, families, local communities and intermediary organizations should not be supplanted by higher-level authorities. Moreover, higher-level institutions must recognize, protect and promote the freedom and creativity of lower-level entities, coordinating their contributions so that they can cooperate effectively for the common good.

In Catholic doctrine, the principle of subsidiarity is therefore above all a principle of dispersing power, of limiting authority, of healthy skepticism toward concentration. Applied to technology, it implies a world in which thousands of actors, large and small, develop, use and shape AI without any of them holding a monopoly on the decision over its use.

This is how, when everyone plays on a level field, good actions triumph over bad ones. A Catholic shapes the world far more durably through just, virtuous and free action than any powerful person can through coercive and disembodied action. The only true protection against human fallibility is not to elevate one man above the others; it is to ensure that no man can impose his fallibility on everyone.

This is where the Austrian School provides a perspective that complements this vision of subsidiarity perfectly. By understanding how monopolies emerge in the market, the Austrians immediately identify the cause of the problem that the encyclical confuses with its solution: the state.

In reality, the market is already regulated, and norms are already in place. The monetary mechanisms of central banks already ensure that capital and power are concentrated mechanically toward large companies, and prevent the emergence of competitors, which are the only natural forces capable of contesting these monopolies.

By placing the individual at the center of the economy and society, the Austrians also understand that the natural solution to these concentrations of power must be sought not from above, but from below—where people, families, and communities live; exactly where Catholic subsidiarity already places primary responsibility.

The encyclical is right on many points, but it overlooks an essential threat by mistaking it for a possible solution. Subsidiarity is the only coherent response to the risk of power concentration. And this is precisely why the reading of Magnifica Humanitas must be complemented with a healthy dose of skepticism toward all those who, under the guise of protecting the common good, in fact aspire to define it alone.

The true alternative to “power concentrated in the hands of a few” who set “the rules of visibility” is not more state intervention, it is that no one—absolutely no one, legislators included—should ever write the rules for everyone else.