History often remembers the 1962 coup in Myanmar as a sudden seizure of power by a power-hungry general. However, from the failed 1948 coup to the one-party authoritarian socialist regime of the 1960s, the roots of Myanmar’s military dictatorship were grown in the soil of radical leftism and their totalitarian ideology. To understand why the military refuses to leave the political stage today, it’s important to look at the politicians who taught the generals that they were the only ones capable of leading a revolution.
Understanding Myanmar’s Politics around 1940s
The struggle for Myanmar’s independence was mainly led by AFPFL (Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League). AFPFL was a popular front that mainly consisted of two rival political groups such as “Communist Party of Burma” and the “Socialist Party of Burma,” along with a non-political entity called “Burma Independence Army.” The Communist Party of Burma was the official Marxist-Leninist party inside Burma, thus having access to the Communist International, attending its events and having relationships with other communist parties all around the world. Their opposition faction inside AFPFL was Burma Socialist Party which was a reformist social democratic party. They organized the Asian Socialist Conference and also worked closely with Socialist International.
The inter-rivalry infighting between CPB and BSP was very intense. CPB organized its proxy trade union called All Burma Trade Union Congress (ABTUC) whereas the Burma Socialist Party controlled its own proxy trade union called the Trade Union Congress (Burma). CPB agitated for a one-party authoritarian socialist state whereas the BSP defended the social democratic tradition of multi-party parliamentary politics. In July and September 1946, the ABTUC—under the leadership of communist leader Than Tun—organized a series of strikes against the AFPFL leadership. As a result, Than Tun lost his position at AFPFL over his disagreement with other factions such as Burma Independence Army led by Aung San and the Burma Socialist Party led by Kyaw Nyein. The position held by the communist leader Than Tun was replaced by Kyaw Nyein, the General Secretary of Burma Socialist Party. In 1946, the CPB was officially expelled from the AFPFL.
In January 1947, Aung San and Kyaw Nyein negotiated with the British labor government led by Clement Attlee in London regarding the independence for Burma. Aung San headed the constitutional assembly and was set to become Burma’s prime minister but was assassinated together with six other members of his cabinet on July 19, a date commemorated as Martyrs’ Day. Being an influential leader within AFPFL and the Burma Independence Army who lost his life during an assassination attempt near the independence, Aung San was highly regarded by the whole nation as their supreme leader and often known as General Aung San for his influence in the army.
Seventy-two days after independence, three newspapers, which were closely affiliated with CPB, reported the alleged rape assault committed by a leader of the farmers’ wing from AFPFL. This scandal was exploited by CPB to organize multiple protests against the AFPFL and BSP. In retaliation, members of the BSP and AFPFL raided and demolished the newspapers. As a result, CPB came to the conclusion that AFPFL was overlooking BSP’s illegal actions. Consequently, the Communist Party planned a gathering in Pyinmana, where over 100,000 people were anticipated to attend. Than Tun was organizing this as the Peasant Union Congress against AFPFL on March 13, 1948.
According to the autobiography of Tin Mya—a life-long Communist—there were even communists from foreign countries attending the event, inspired by the organizing power of the CPB and insisting that the CPB lead an uprising.
Leftist Unity Council
Given the political climate, the Leftist Unity Council was formed on July 16, 1948, to build mutual understanding between the communists and the socialists. The committee was composed of leftists from the military rank, the Burma Socialist Party, People’s Volunteer Organization, and Marxist-Leninists from different political entities. Ne Win—a party member of Communist Party of Burma, who later will be known as the first dictator of Myanmar for his coups in 1958 and 1962—was the chair of Leftist Unity Council whereas Thein Pe Myint—the third General Secretary of Communist Party of Burma—was the General Secretary of Leftist Unity Council.
The Failed Debut: The 1948 Military Coup Plot Before 1958 and 1962
In Myanmar’s political history, mentions of military coups usually bring to mind General Ne Win in 1958 and 1962. However, it is little known that the first attempt to the first military coup occurred in August 1948, only seven months after independence.
Thein Pe Myint—along with some members of the Leftist Unity Council—incited the military to seize power to form a socialist coalition government. The Leftist Unity Council prepared the coup measures, setting the time around August 1948. Thein Pe Myint attempted to persuade Maj-Gen Ne Win to conduct the coup on behalf of the Leftist Unity Council. Ne Win, however, refused to conduct the 1948 coup. Nevertheless, other influential leaders of Burma Independence Army such as Bo Zeya and commander of Battalion 3 Bo Ye Htut continued with their plan to stage an armed revolt.
1962 Coup: Forbidden History of Marxist-Leninists behind Burmese Way to Socialism
Following the 1962 coup, the Myanmar military, led by General Ne Win, established the Revolutionary Council of the Union of Burma to govern the country with a new ideology: the “Burmese Way to Socialism.” Thein Phe Myint—along with many members of Leftist Unity Council—welcomed the 1962 coup as a “progressive revolution” against “feudalism” and “capitalist liberal democracy.”
Ne Win’s Revolutionary Council of the Union of Burma had to U Chit Hlaing who had been a member of three distinct far-left political parties: the Communist Party of Burma, the Red Flag Communist Party of Burma, and the Burma Socialist Party. He was also the founder of People’s Literature Company which translated and interpreted the works of Karl Marx and Mao Zedong. Chit Hlaing’s intellectual journey was shaped by his experiences abroad. During his time at CPB, due to his disagreements with CPB’s official line of Stalinism, he was denied a chance to study in the Soviet Union. Thus, he instead went to Paris on his own.
There, from 1951 to 1955, he was exposed to new revisionist Marxist-Leninist ideas, particularly the Marxism of Marshal Tito in Yugoslavia, who had defied Stalin without aligning with the Western bloc. This example of non-orthodox Communism and the rise of the Non-Aligned Movement deeply influenced Chit Hlaing. Upon his return to Burma in 1955, Chit Hlaing began writing for the military-published magazine Myawaddy. In his articles, he criticized Stalinism and developed the philosophical framework of “synthesis of idealism and materialism.” Indeed, Chit Hlaing’s syncretic ideology sought to lay a philosophical foundation combining Marxist materialism, anti-imperialism, and nationalism with local Buddhist principles. General Ne Win—the coup leader of Burma Socialist Programme Party—adopted U Chit Hlaing’s ideology as the main ideology of his regime. Tin Mya—a former alternate member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Burma—also helped the BSPP regime to develop its ideology of the “Burmese Way to Socialism” along with U Chit Hlaing.
The BSPP’s guiding doctrine—the “Burmese Way to Socialism”—indeed incorporated many features and policies associated with Marxism-Leninism. However, they didn’t follow in a dogmatic way. Yet, Chit Maung—the co-founder of Burma Workers and Peasants Party (a Marxist-Leninist party) which was also called “Red Socialists,” along with many of its members—also either welcomed the regime or later joined the BSPP regime. U Ba Nyein—another leader of Marxist-Leninist Burma Workers and Peasants Party—became the architect of the “Burmese Way to Socialism” economic policy and became a key member of the Central Organizing Committee of the BSPP. He pushed for the total nationalization of private businesses, shops, and banks. Khin Maung Kyi—another leader of Burma Workers and Peasants Party—served in the Central Organizing Committee of BSPP and was a member of the Advisory Committee on National Ideology for General Ne Win. Similarly, Maung Sue San from Communist Party of Burma served as Director of the State Commercial Bank, Academic Member of the University of Economics, and External Lecturer Examiner under the BSPP government.
Conclusion
The tragedy of Myanmar’s contemporary history is that its “coup culture” was carefully crafted by those who envisioned a totalitarian socialist state as an alternative to capitalism, rather than emerging from a void of military ambition alone. They wanted to turn the army from a national army into a “vanguard,” persuading successive generations of officers that the military had a “revolutionary” right to total power and that democracy was a Western weakness. This “Marxist-Leninist” DNA—characterized by isolationism, the destruction of the private sector, and the brutal suppression of dissent—remains the blueprint for the current junta. The “Burmese Way to Socialism” may have failed as an economic experiment, but as a statist mechanism for perpetual military dictatorship, it has proven to be a devastating success.
