Madrid Requests European Army | Armstrong Economics

Spain’s latest position perfectly illustrates what has become one of the great contradictions within NATO. Madrid wants Europe to build its own military capable of acting independently of Washington, yet Spain has consistently resisted NATO’s higher defense spending targets while expecting the alliance to continue providing collective security.

Spain is again championing the idea of a European army while insisting it can meet its NATO obligations without matching the spending commitments accepted by virtually every other member. Europe cannot demand strategic independence while simultaneously asking someone else to pay the bill.

I have said for years that Europe has always dreamed of becoming an independent military power. Long before the war in Ukraine, Brussels was discussing a unified European army, common procurement, centralized command, and eventually a foreign policy independent of Washington. Every crisis has been used to advance that objective. The migration crisis expanded Brussels’ authority. COVID centralized health policy. The Ukraine war accelerated fiscal integration through joint borrowing and massive defense spending. Now the argument is that Europe needs its own army because it can no longer rely entirely on the United States. That has been the destination all along.

Ironically, Spain is making the argument while remaining one of NATO’s weakest contributors. Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez rejected the alliance’s new goal of spending 5% of GDP on defense by 2035, insisting Spain can fulfill its obligations while spending only about 2.1% of GDP. That position has frustrated allies who argue collective defense cannot function if some members continually expect others to shoulder the burden. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte has repeatedly argued that Europe’s security environment now requires substantially greater investment across the alliance.

Europe must ultimately decide what it wants. If it genuinely intends to build an independent military capable of defending the continent without American leadership, then it must also accept the enormous financial burden that comes with that decision. A modern European army would require hundreds of billions of euros in new spending, integrated command structures, common procurement, expanded ammunition production, satellite capabilities, cyber warfare, missile defense, logistics, and nuclear deterrence. None of that comes cheaply.

The greatest long-term strategic challenge is no longer Europe. It is the Indo-Pacific. China is rapidly expanding its navy, modernizing its nuclear arsenal, increasing pressure on Taiwan, and competing directly with the United States across technology, manufacturing, shipping, and finance. America cannot simultaneously concentrate the majority of its military resources in Europe while preparing for a potential confrontation in Asia.

If Europe believes Russia represents its primary existential threat, then Europe should take primary responsibility for confronting Russia. That is neither anti-European nor isolationist. It is simply strategic reality. The United States should remain an ally, but not Europe’s permanent security guarantor. Washington has carried that burden since the end of the Second World War. Meanwhile, European governments repeatedly criticize American foreign policy while relying upon American aircraft carriers, intelligence, logistics, nuclear deterrence, and taxpayers whenever a genuine crisis emerges.

The post-1945 order is fragmenting. Nations are increasingly pursuing regional spheres of influence rather than a single American-led global system. Europe seeks strategic autonomy. China seeks dominance in Asia. Russia seeks influence over its near abroad. The United States must decide where its vital interests truly lie. If Europe wants its own army, then let Europe build it. America’s focus should increasingly shift toward maintaining stability in the Pacific, where the balance of power over the next several decades is far more likely to determine the future of the global economy than another generation of underwriting European defense.