Lessons From Mises on Resolving the History Wars

The truth about historical events cannot be evaluated purely by reference to the ideological perspective of the historian, for example, whether he is a Marxist or a libertarian. Much as it is tempting to believe that people we already agree with must be the only ones telling the truth about history, that method of evaluation would mean that each historian has his own personal “truth” that is dictated by his own ideology, and that readers may choose the “true” interpretation of history based on whether they agree with the historian’s ideology.

Those who reject any author’s ideology could safely dismiss his historical analysis as “false”—he only said that because he is a Marxist, or he only said that because he is a libertarian. In the discipline of history—like any scholarly discipline—it should be possible objectively to ascertain the truth about historical events. Even when the full truth is lost in the mists of time, it should be possible objectively to ascertain what is, or is not, likely to have happened. The question is, how would a reader distinguish between an “objective” interpretation of primary sources and a “Marxist” or “libertarian” interpretation?

An answer to this question may be found in Ludwig von Mises’s Theory and History: An Interpretation of Economic and Social Evolution. Murray Rothbard described this book as “Mises’s great methodological work, explaining the basis of his approach to economics, and providing scintillating critiques of such fallacious alternatives as historicism, scientism, and Marxian dialectical materialism.” While Mises sought in this book to put in context the methodology of economics, we can also derive important lessons about the methodology of history insofar as history attempts to describe and explain human events and human action. This helps in resolving the so-called history wars, in which one interpretation of history is alleged to be “racist” and “white supremacist” while a different interpretation of the same events is alleged to be “Marxist.” Mises insisted that the only way to resolve such disputes is through critical analysis based on logical reasoning. The truth cannot be ascertained simply by exposing the subjective beliefs and motivations of an author. It does not suffice for either side to merely assert that their opponents are biased. Exposing the fact that a historian is biased does not suffice to dispose of his arguments. It is necessary to go further and show that there are “fallacies in the chain of reasoning.” Mises explains:

All that counts is whether a doctrine is sound or unsound. This is to be established by discursive reasoning. It does not in the least detract from the soundness and correctness of a theory if the psychological forces that prompted its author are disclosed. The motives that guided the thinker are immaterial to appreciating his achievement…. Reference to a thinker’s bias is no substitute for a refutation of his doctrines by tenable arguments. Those who charge the economists with bias merely show that they are at a loss to refute their teachings by critical analysis.

Mises discusses two further themes that are helpful in understanding how ideology influences the history wars—the universal nature of human action and the principles of methodological individualism. We must understand that people make choices based on their subjective preferences, and that these can only be ascertained by reference to the individuals in question. Historians can ascertain, objectively, what a person thought, said, or did, based on examination of primary sources. Mises explains:

Hence the history of human affairs has to deal with the judgments of value that impelled men to act and directed their conduct. What happened in history cannot be discovered and narrated without referring to the various valuations of the acting individuals.

Reports of how an individual expressed his motivations or his worldview, based on examination of primary sources, can be relied on as true, regardless of the ideological opinions of the historian. But when a historian purports to deduce the subjective preferences of an individual based entirely on the collective group to which an individual belonged, or by reference purely to the time or historical epoch in which he lived, that cannot be relied on as the truth. It is merely the historian’s view of what a group of people who lived in that time and place ought to have thought, and the values they ought to have held, which ultimately is a form of polylogism. Because choices and preferences are those of the individual, not the group, it is to the individual that the historian must look to understand the choices he made. This means that any history that attempts to explain human action by reference to methodological collectivism cannot be relied on as the truth.

Further, while historians may describe and explain the value judgments held by those involved in past events (“the various valuations of the acting individuals”), it is not the task of the historian to make value judgments of his own concerning those events. The historian who offers his own value judgments is no longer speaking as a historian, but in a personal capacity most often intended to advance a particular political perspective or ideology. It is true that scholars often find it difficult to avoid expressing their own value judgments of the material they discuss, but this human tendency should present little impediment to ascertaining the truth as long as a clear separation is kept between historical interpretation and personal opinion. Mises explains:

It is not the task of the historian qua historian to pass judgments of value on the individuals whose conduct is the theme of his inquiries.… It is a fact that hardly any historian has fully avoided passing judgments of value. But such judgments are always merely incidental to the genuine tasks of history. In uttering them the author speaks as an individual judging from the point of view of his personal valuations, not as a historian.

To ascertain the truth about historical events, we must therefore distinguish between descriptions of the value judgments made by historical actors based on what they themselves thought or said, and the author’s own value judgments that reflect his own ideology. Oddly enough, Marxist historians do not trouble themselves with these matters. They simply deny being influenced by their own ideology and claim that they merely presented primary sources that “speak for themselves” which makes their historical accounts “objective” and “neutral.” 

But at the same time, they claim that it is not possible for non-Marxist historians to be objective. We are to understand that historians who do not embrace Marxist ideologies must be unconsciously expressing ideologies of “white supremacy” in their historical accounts, because they cannot separate their own racial biases from their historical interpretations. Marxists do not suffer from such “unconscious bias” in their historical interpretations—this is a failing coincidentally found only among those who are not Marxists. In the history wars, Marxist historians publish objective, scholarly, history based on primary-source evidence which is not biased at all, as exemplified by Eric Foner. All other historians are racists, as exemplified by the Dunning School, which is cancelled for exhibiting unconscious bias and white supremacy. Mises shows how such skewed interpretations can be avoided, in the search for the truth about contested historical events.