$700M in Iran war bets and $1.2M in suspicious profits push Washington toward prediction-market crackdown

Polymarket and Kalshi are trying to raise money at valuations that put them in the top tier of consumer-fintech names, even as Washington moves closer to writing new rules for the product they sell. Both companies are reportedly in early fundraising talks that could value each at around $20 billion.

That fundraising chatter is taking place in the middle of a political storm.

Iran-related contracts turned prediction markets from a quirky forecasting niche into a question about insider information and incentives around war. Reuters reviewed Polymarket markets tied to the timing of attacks and Khamenei’s removal and found about $529 million wagered on timing-of-attack contracts and about $150 million on Khamenei-related contracts, alongside claims of unusually well-timed trading that generated about $1.2 million in profit across six accounts.

Now lawmakers are drafting legislation, and the CFTC said it’s also moving toward new rulemaking.

Wall Street believes that probabilities will become part of the information system. But Washington is standing in its way because it believes the system can reward the wrong people at the worst moments.

Wall Street is buying the probability layer story

Prediction markets convert attention into transactions and transactions into fees, while also producing a live probability feed that can be packaged as data.

That second product is the part that pulls prediction markets out of the gambling bucket and into the same group as market data, polling, and financial terminals, because the output is designed to look and behave like a quote.

Media partnerships have started doing the distribution for them. CNBC signed a multi-year deal with Kalshi to integrate its probabilities into TV and digital programming starting in 2026, which puts event-contract pricing into the everyday flow of business news.

Dow Jones signed an exclusive deal with Polymarket to bring prediction market data into The Wall Street Journal, Barron’s, and MarketWatch products, which effectively treats a contract price like a piece of reporting infrastructure that can sit next to earnings, rates, and election coverage.

Those deals also tighten the consequences of a scandal, because the markets are no longer a novelty that people can ignore. Once probabilities are embedded in mainstream outlets, they start shaping what readers think is plausible, urgent, or imminent. This is why regulators believe the platforms have to answer a higher standard around integrity, surveillance, and settlement.

It also explains why the companies’ valuation kept rising even as the Iran markets drew political heat.

Iran turned prediction markets into a Washington problem

The market’s cleanest edge is early knowledge, and the Iran contracts clearly showed that these platforms deal with the kind of information governments try to control.

On March 2, there was about $529 million wagered on timing-of-attack markets and around $150 million on contracts related to Khamenei’s death and removal from office. Just six accounts made $1.2 million in profit from these contracts, all funded just several hours before the raids that killed the Iranian leader.

Multiple other reports of newly created accounts making unusually well-timed Iran bets also began popping up as the conflict escalated. This kind of mainstream reporting pulled Polymarket out of the crypto novelty category and landed it in the midst of government surveillance and enforcement.

The main issues these platforms now face are trust and fairness.

A prediction market only works when people believe the rules are stable, the outcomes are adjudicated consistently, and the playing field isn’t tilted toward insiders. When the underlying event is military action, that trust problem becomes political, because the incentive to trade early becomes an incentive to leak sensitive and even classified information.

That’s why the policy response escalated so fast.

Rep. Mike Levin and Sen. Chris Murphy are already working on legislation aimed at reining in prediction markets after the Iran bets. This puts Congress directly in charge of defining what event contracts should be allowed to cover.

Separately, CFTC Chair Michael Selig said the agency submitted an advance notice of proposed rulemaking to the White House budget office and would move soon on a prediction-markets rule proposal. This tells us a regulatory framework is in the works that could affect everything from contract design and monitoring to enforcement priorities.

The choice Washington faces is pretty straightforward, even if the implementation is technical.

Regulators can treat prediction markets as legitimate event contracts and build stronger monitoring and clearer limits, which could help the category keep scaling with a more defined rulebook.

They can also fence off categories tied to war, assassination, and leadership removal, because those contracts concentrate the insider-information risk and create ugly incentives.

A snapshot shows why this collision is hard to smooth over:

FlashpointWhat was reportedWhy it grabbed attentionValuation talks~$20 billion each for Polymarket and Kalshi (early talks)Venture pricing collides with legal riskIran timing markets~$529 million wageredEvent contracts attached to military actionKhamenei-related markets~$150 million wageredDeath and leadership outcomes as tradable contractsSuspicious profit claims~$1.2 million across six accountsInsider information fear tied to timingKalshi payout dispute~$54 million in claimed winningsTrust fight inside the regulated player

Kalshi’s own dispute shows why regulation alone doesn’t end the trust question.

On March 5, Kalshi was sued for failing to pay $54 million to users who bet that the Iranian Supreme Leader would leave office before March 1. The class action suit, filed in California, alleges that the company didn’t invoke a “death carveout” provision until after the Iranian leader was killed to avoid paying customers.

Kalshi, however, says its rules about trading on death outcomes were explicit, and that it reimbursed fees and losses so users didn’t lose money.

That’s the kind of tension investors and policymakers are now dealing with.

Investors want growth, distribution, and a clean case for a probability feed that belongs in the mainstream.

Users want rules that feel stable when outcomes become contentious and emotionally loaded.

Regulators want to prevent a market from turning sensitive state action into a tradable instrument where the best trade is the best leak, because that risk becomes a governance problem the moment these prices start shaping the information environment.