I hope readers will forgive me for relying heavily on a fresh interview at Dialogue Works to assess the prospects for a “deal” between the US and Iran on its nuclear enrichment program and other security matters. However, former ambassador Chas Freeman, former Defense and State Department official Larry Wilkerson and Trita Parsi, co-founder of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, all have extensive experience in the region and have been keeping abreast of the latest developments about the indirect negotiations, falsely hyped by Trump as direct talks, set for Saturday in Oman.
The stakes are very high. The US has made a show of force, moving not just naval assets into the area and B2 stealth bombers to Diego Garcia, but also according to Wilkerson in other YouTube talks, other strike forces. A new broadcast by The Electronic Intifada confirms Wilkerson, per the map at 16:45 and the additional detail provided starting at 15:55, of THADD and Patriot missile launchers being delivered to Israel’s Nevatim air base.
Trump, in a meeting with Netanyahu, as you can see in the Dialogue Works discussion embedded above, starting at 1:05, made a barely veiled threat of military action if the talks failed.
In the short version of what follows, we see very little reason for optimism. There are already reasons to think the US will continue to make demands that amount to Iran giving up not just its military and civilian nuclear programs, but also its missiles and its alliances with the so-called Axis of Resistance, which is tantamount to rendering itself defenseless. Alastair Crooke and Douglas Macgregor, among others, deemed this to be clearly unacceptable.
Macgregor, in a Judge Napolitano talk mentioned in the segment above, ventured that these provision were designed to be unacceptable and rejected, just as Austria-Hungary’s ultimatum to Serbia after the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand was overreaching by design, and meant, as it did, to serve as a pretext for going to war.
Even if the US is actually not seeking an excuse to attack Iran and is simply resorting to the Trump default of maximalist demands to see how much it can squeeze out of a counterparty, and is prepared to accept a lot less, it still seems unlikely that the two sides can agree.
I suspect a core US demand, aside from dismantling the nuclear enrichment program, would be for Iran to get the Ansar Allah (aka Houthis) to stop attacking shipments to Israel. Trump could present the Houthis stopping their campaign as a huge win, one Joe Biden was unable to achieve.
However, it does not appear that that is something Iran could deliver even if it wanted to. The most it could do was promise not to send more funds, weapons, and technical assistance. The Houthis have agency. Alastair Crooke has explained the Houthi tenacity, despite taking as much punishment as they have, as a manifestation of Shia character, particularly the willingness to make sacrifices in the name of religious obligation, and they see combating the Israeli genocide as an obligation. He described how after the Caliphate came to control Shia areas that it barred going to Shia mosques, with the penalty the amputation of a finger. The Shia kept going, losing all their fingers, then toes, then hands, then feet. We soft Westerners cannot comprehend that degree of commitment to moral principles.
So I doubt the Iranians can call off Ansar Allah. And if the Iranian tried explaining why, the US team would dismiss that as bad faith and/or foot dragging. The effort to reason would simply enrage the Trump side.
There is the further obstacle that the neocons around Trump, and probably Trump himself, believes the Israel/US propaganda about how the negotiated Iran retaliatory strike into Israel was a failure, and how the Israel attack on Iran after that did serious damage. John Helmer reported on a recent Dialogue Works that Trump has had all of two intelligence briefings since he took office; cable TV is a more important information source for him. So it’s a safe bet that he discounts warnings that Iran would survive a US/Israel attack and would then destroy Israel and wreck the world economy.
That is before getting to the fact that Israel has agency. Netanyahu in particular is determined to escalate against Iran to save his own hide. In the Dialogue Works talk, one of the interviewees (Wilkerson?) said Netanyahu had rushed to Washington to try to get relief from the then 17% tariffs imposed on Israel. It had been reported, as this source stated, that Trump refused to go there and instead talked about Iran. In addition, Trump blindsided Netanyahu by saying that “direct” talks with Iran were set for Saturday. Trita Parsi said the Trump public remarks also caught Iran off guard. The timing and location of the talks were supposed to be kept quiet.1
But Netanyahu, even with being caught off guard, upped the ante by calling for the “Libya” solution, which was not just regime change, but also the death-by-bayonet-ass-rape of the Gaddafi, celebrated in Hillary Clinton’s “We came, we saw, he died” cackle.
As Chas Freeman drily remarked, advocating the Libya solution to Iran would be like proposing the Pearl Harbor solution to the US. So even in his brief airtime, Netanyahu tried to and may have thrown a spanner.
In addition, as we have said, a false flag attack is one way to sandbag negotiations.
But another seemingly insurmountable impediment is process. There simply is not enough time. The interviewers allude to that obstacle in various ways but fail to take their observations to its logical conclusion.
Consider:
1. The US and Israel are relying on the so-called snapback provisions of the JCPOA to bring Iran to heel2. The short version is that the US has a bullet-proof means to restore the stringent UN sanctions imposed on Iran that the JCPOA alleviated. But those expire on October 18 unless they are extended (unlikely) or the US has an ally trigger them, and the UK has already said it would. The Iranian economy is already in bad shape. There is a bit of a drill involved in triggering the snapback, so there is only a four-plus month window to consummate an agreement.
2. This would be a very complex agreement when complexity and haste do not go together well. For instance, the US, as it has been with Russia, is willfully blind to the impact of its extensive history of bad faith dealings. Or maybe US officials really do have the memory of goldfish. They just can’t recall that it was Trump that chose to exit the JCPOA and then accuse Iran of developing a nuke, despite US intelligence agencies continuing to find, with a high degree of confidence, that that has not happened and is not yet in the works. .
For Iran to agree to what the US wants, it would need security guarantees. But it is conducting these talks on a bi-lateral basis. Pray tell, who could provide these guarantees? Not Russia, given that the Ukraine talks have gone pear shaped plus the US is full of Putin-haters. Certainly not China. Turkiye had the biggest army in the region and is trusted by no one.
Even putting aside the “How does Iran reduce its risk of being completely violated?” elephant in the room, as Freeman and Wilkerson stressed, going back to the JCPOA talks, technical experts would need to be involved to negotiate fine points, such as verification. It’s not clear that the Trump side understands that and has kept DOGE from firing them.
3. The US side is inexperienced and with no apparent knowledge of Iran’s culture or history.
4. Trump’s best negotiator, who is leading these talks, Steve Witkoff, has a record of failure in trying to play diplomat. This may admittedly be due in part to inability to manage his side, such as undermining by neocons and Trump refusal to make concessions.
For instance, the Russia-US talks on Ukraine, again under Witkoff’s leadership, are stalled due to the two US ceasefire schemes, one to stop energy infrastructure attacks, the other to resume the so-called grain deal, both being sabotaged, the first by Ukraine, the second by the EU. The US seems to have no idea what to do now. And even the seeemingly-simple measure, of renormalizing diplomatic relations, also seems to no longer be advance despite both sides going through the motions of meetings. Reuters and other outlets just released bland reports on the latest six hour meeting in Istanbul. Even though the US side mentioned “constructive” and the Russian, “positive” and “move forward,” there was no evidence of progress. Reuters mentioned only impasses, like the failure to restore banking services for Russian staffs and the US insistence that Russia hire some locals (huh?), and agreement that flights should be resumed but no indication that was being made to happen. Reuters also threw in at the end: “Among the issues is diplomatic property.”
John Helmer clarified:
ANOTHER NOTHING BURGER FROM TRUMP TO PUTIN. Sonata Coulter of State Dept in Istanbul talks with Alexander Darchiev of Rus ForMin fail to agree on recovery of Rus Emb property in US except for bank account to pay local bills. https://t.co/rPzGwVJoOw pic.twitter.com/9Fm05rPXp6
— Dances_with_Bears (@bears_with) April 11, 2025
So if the US can’t even take this small step to show it can do something to help Russia that will also help the US, how can they be taken seriously? Is this just spite over Russia completely reasonably sticking to its guns on the grain deal, or US incompetence? Either way, it does no inspire confidence.
On the other side of the ledger, Trump really needs a win. But what does that look like to him? He’s already demonstrated a shocking cavalierness about wanton destruction. Being acknowledged as a driver of events is more important to him than outcomes. So what if he starts World War III?
Now Witkoff is having a meeting with Putin right on the eve of the talks with Iran. But I don’t see this as as potentially de-escalatory as it ought to be. If the US had wanted to consider Russia’s point of view and more important, any signal regarding its position vis-a-vis Iran, or alternatively wanted advice, the time to have done that would not be so close to the actual meeting. Again, there’s not enough time to meaningfully course change, only course tweak, when Putin’s views should have been a major factor in devising the Iran negotiations strategy.
Now admittedly, the Trump Administration does not hew to anything resembling normal behavior. But the timing of the Putin talk suggests that to the extent that they talk about Iran (which Witkoff could also oddly minimize) is consistent with Witkoff seeing himself as mainly giving Putin a general heads up, as Rubio did with Lavrov before the US resumed attacks on the Houthis. Again, as Larry Johnson said in a fresh talk with Nima, Putin may well give Witkoff a “Are you Americans nuts?” level talking-to. But I don’t see Witkoff having a lot of degrees of freedom at this hour. However, if the talks don’t go the way he and Trump would like, any Putin input might gain a lot more weight.
Now admittedly, the Pentagon ought to know that attacking Iran would be a massive losing proposition. But dumb-as-a-rock bully Hegseth is in charge, and has just purged a lot of generals. The ones left were presumably chosen for their dearth of diversity points and toadying tendencies. So the needed naysaying may be in absence.
Now Trump does have a decent fallback position, which is simply to exploit the snapback provisions. Iran is punished. Trump honor is saved. But is that going to provide sufficiently high drama and demonstration of dominance to suit Trump’s true interests?
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1 I don’t see the talks being “indirect” but in the same building as a positive a sign as other make it out to be. Given Trump’s repeated insistence that that the talks be direct, and then him needing to misrepresent that to save face, Iran may have agreed or offered to have the two parties in close proximity as a concession. Some experts contend this means the talks on the spot could be flipped to direct. That may be the US hope but Americans like to rush negotiations.
2 From IranWire:
As October 18, 2025, approaches – the tenth anniversary of the JCPOA and the deadline for deciding whether to terminate or extend UN Security Council Resolution 2231 – the snapback mechanism outlined in the resolution has once again drawn attention in Iran.
UN Security Council Resolution 2231 was adopted after the JCPOA agreement was reached, and it annulled six previous Security Council resolutions regarding Iran’s nuclear program and most of the UN sanctions.
However, it included a provision that if the Islamic Republic fails to comply with the JCPOA, the sanctions could quickly be reimposed.
Britain has said it is prepared to trigger the snapback mechanism against Iran over violations of the nuclear deal.
How Does the Snapback Mechanism Work?
Any of the current members of the JCPOA – France, the UK, Germany, China, and Russia – can invoke the snapback mechanism if they claim Iran has violated the agreement.
The United States, having withdrawn from the JCPOA and reimposed sanctions during Donald Trump’s presidency, has lost its political leverage to use snapback.
However, it can request its activation through other countries. The U.S. government failed in its attempt to invoke snapback during the first term of Trump’s presidency.
Four of the JCPOA member states that are permanent members of the UN Security Council can directly activate the mechanism.
Germany, which is not a member of the Security Council, must seek activation through one of its permanent members.
In the first step, one or more JCPOA member states must send a letter to the UN Secretary-General and the president of the Security Council about Iran’s non-compliance with the terms of the agreement.
Once the letter is submitted, the president of the Security Council must inform the other members of the warning.
The Security Council has 10 days from the formal receipt of the letter to vote on a draft resolution regarding the continuation or termination of the suspension of Security Council sanctions on the Islamic Republic.
No veto power exists, and the time frame is only 30 days.
In the Security Council’s vote on the resolution, veto power was removed following a proposal by Russia, meaning no country could block the draft resolution or prevent the return of sanctions on Iran using a veto.
If a country uses its veto, it would effectively veto the continuation of sanctions relief for Iran, leading to the immediate reimposition of UN Security Council sanctions on Iran’s nuclear program.
The continuation of sanctions relief can only be approved if nine votes in favor are achieved in the Security Council, with no permanent member vetoing it.
