Despite roughly a decade of stories about a split between President Recep Tayyip ErdoganErdogan’s Türkiye and the US, ties appear as strong as ever. Erdogan continues to make bold statements against Israeli expansionary aims, but beyond the rhetoric Türkiye has done nothing but aid in the Palestinian genocide by continuing to ship oil and other goods to Israel. Türkiye is now dealing with the aftermath of the arrest of Erdogan’s biggest political rival, Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu, on corruption charges and accusations of supporting terrorism. And it’s notable how quiet the US and EU have been. Sure it would be hypocritical of them to lecture on the freedom of speech crackdown, but that’s not stopped them before. Elon Musk’s X, formerly known is Twitter, is also helping Türkiye crack down on dissent as it has done in the past.
President Trump did Erdogan a solid last week by endorsing him and helping calm Turkish markets. According to Bloomberg, the exodus of foreign capital following the arrest of Imamoglu probably reduced Türkiye’s foreign-currency reserves by $26.6 billion over just three days from March 19-21 — an expensive removal of a political rival. This left the central bank’s net reserves at $32.4 billion at the end of last week, economist Selva Bahar Baziki wrote. More:
Trump praised President Erdogan, confirming investor expectations that Turkey was likely to face little external political pressure after Ekrem Imamoglu, the popular mayor of Istanbul and the head of state’s main political rival, was detained and then jailed.
“Good place, good leader, too,” Trump said during a meeting of ambassadorial nominees on Tuesday. Trump’s comments came after a brief introduction by Tom Barrack, the founder of Colony Capital LLC who is Trump’s longtime friend and nominee to be ambassador to Turkey.
Trump’s “confirming investor expectations that Turkey was likely to face little external political pressure” helps explain why Erdogan moved to consolidate power now. After ruling for more than two decades he is looking to change the constitution so he can run for another term in the next presidential election scheduled for no later than May 7, 2028. And there’s reason to believe he and his circle want to keep rule in the family even after he’s gone. The arrest of Imamoglu and ensuing crackdown help move toward that goal.
And right now the West needs him. Europe is desperate for Turkish cooperation in the crazy plan to build a coalition to go into Ukraine.Ankara is a key player in Syria after helping to topple Bashar al-Assad. The US wants Türkiye’s help encircling Iran.
“Erdoğan has read the geopolitical moment rather well,” Aslı Aydıntaşbaş, a visiting fellow at the Washington-based Brookings Institution, told Agence France-Presse.
It is often said that Türkiye is transactional in its ties (aren’t most countries?). Recently there seem to be a lot of unannounced transactions taking place. Let’s take a look.
Easing Defense Restrictions
Back in October, not long before the offensive to overthrow Assad, the US and its European vassals suddenly ended a years-long unofficial embargo imposed by Western allies on Türkiye, which has hampered its defense sector development. According to Nordic Monitor, “At the forefront of countries posing difficulties in Türkiye’s procurement is Germany, which has been withholding export permits for firms supplying Türkiye with much-needed engines and power systems for its domestic projects.”
Now we’re approaching the end of official sanctions on the Turkish defense industry imposed under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). They were applied to Türkiye by the Trump administration in 2020 following Ankara’s acquisition of the Russian-made S-400 missile defense system in 2019. Türkiye was also suspended from the F-35 program.
Ankara has been eager to get out from under the sanctions — which hurt particular imports like semiconductors and microchips — as they hurt the country’s defense industry ambitions, which include its own air defense project and domestically-produced fighter jets.
Reuters reported on Wednesday following a meeting between Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio that the two countries are moving towards the lifting of CAATSA sanctions and readmission to the F-35 program.
There has also been speculation that Erdogan might be visiting the US soon to seal the deal.
Meanwhile, the US and Europe are both increasingly relying on Türkiye for weapons manufacturing.
The US Army just signed a $435 million deal with Türkiye’s Repkon to design, build, and commission a TNT production facility in the US aimed at building up the US supply of munitions.
BAE Systems, too, just inked a deal with Repkon USA to collaborate on the development and manufacture of advanced munitions.
Repkon is reportedly soon expected to produce about 30 percent of all US-made 155mm artillery shells. Last year the Pentagon bought 116,000 rounds of ammunition from Turkiye’s Arca Defense and more purchases purchases are expected this year. And although the the Pentagon contracts General Dynamics Ordnance and Tactical Systems (a US company) to build three 155mm projectile metal parts lines in Texas, but the company is relying on Turkish subcontractors to do the work,
While EU-Türkiye defense cooperation is caapped by opposition from member states Greece and Cyprus, some bloc countries are increasingly inking deals with Ankara. And as the EU looks to scale up weaponry purchases due to the imaginary threats of Russia invasion and US abandonment, they could be looking to Türkiye even more.
Here’s the International Institute for Strategic Studies with some background on the budding relationship:
While the sale of armed UAVs has been high-profile and lucrative, Turkish industry has also enjoyed success in other domains. Of the country’s four major armoured vehicle manufacturers, three – BMC, Nurol Makina and Otokar – have won contracts with European customers. Most significantly, in late 2024, Otokar secured a contract with Romania for 1,059 Cobra II 4×4 vehicles, the majority of which will be built locally. In the maritime domain, the recent success in Portugal follows a 2020 contract with Ukraine for two corvettes based on Turkiye’s Ada-class (MILGEM) design.
Other opportunities are also being acted on. In December, Spain signed an agreement to collaborate with Turkiye on a new jet training aircraft – almost certainly TAI’s Hürjet – with media reports suggesting that this could form part of a wider swap deal, with Spanish Airbus A400M airlifters going in the other direction. Although Hürjet is currently in the prototype phase, TAI might also see opportunities with other countries that have a jet trainer requirement. Elsewhere, Baykar’s acquisition of troubled Italian aerospace company Piaggio Aerospace received approval in December, with hopes that it will provide another entry point into the Italian and wider European market.
On the drone front, Türkiye and Italy entered into a mega partnership last month. Turkish UAV giant Baykar (owned by Erdogan’s son-in-law) is teaming up with Leonardo for its electronics and radars in a 50-50 joint venture to make new-and-improved drones in both Türkiye and Italy, which would “ease certification for selling in a European market worth $100 billion in the next ten years”
We can’t forget the Macron-Starmer suicidal idea to go into Ukraine either. They’re desperate to get Türkiye onboard. Here’s Turkish Minute:
Britain and France are leading efforts to form a so-called coalition of the willing of countries willing to assist Ukraine by sending hardware and even troops, with Türkiye a key partner due to its large military, world-class drone production and rare position of cordial ties with both Kyiv and Moscow.
Are they hoping Russia won’t attack them if there are Turkish troops and Ankara’s cordial relationship with Moscow?
Project Encircle Iran
Beyond the US and Europe turning to Türkiye in a desperate bid to keep up with Russian artillery production, what else could all the easing of sanctions and unofficial embargoes signify?
Maybe there’s a potential clash of Greater Israel and Greater Türkiye in the future but for now both countries appear united under the US umbrella with the goal of destabilizing Iran.
Türkiye has long opposed the Iran-led Axis of Resistance, groups aligned with and/or backed by Iran operating across the Middle East. As we mentioned a=on a recent piece on Middle East logistics wars, the Iran-Iraq-Syria corridor was one of Tehran’s major strategic goals to secure access to the Mediterranean.
The destruction of Syria by the US-Israel-Türkiye destroyed that goal.
And Türkiye is trying to implement new projects in its place, such as routes through Iraq.
Developments are also underway in the South Caucasus that seem to be inching towards a US- and Israel-supported agreement between Armenia, Azerbaijan, and perhaps Türkiye that would effectively block Iran to its north.
Tehran is worried that Türkiye and Azerbaijan — through force or negotiations with Armenia, which is now heavily influenced by Washington — will open a corridor in Armenia along its border with Iran. Should Türkiye and Azerbaijan do so, Tehran would lose influence over both as Azerbaijan currently relies on transit through Iran to connect to its exclave and Türkiye is dependent on Iran for logistics to bypass Armenia. Tehran is especially worried about a NATO Turan Corridor which sees the West link up hypothetical client states throughout central Asia. From Dr. Vali Kaleji, a Tehran-based expert on Central Asia and Caucasian Studies:
Iran sees the creation of the Zangezur corridor as a matter beyond the access of the Republic of Azerbaijan to Nakhchivan exclave and believes that this corridor will provide direct military access for Türkiye as a NATO member in the Caucasus and west of the Caspian Sea. Indeed, a significant number of Iranian elites and experts believe that the expansion of Türkiye’s presence in the South Caucasus, especially through the Zangezur corridor, will strengthen pan-Turkism in the region, which is a direct threat to the Azeri regions of north-western Iran.
The peace steps between Türkiye and the Kurds as another potential piece sliding into place for the encroachment eastwards of Greater Israel, Greater Türkiye and the NATO stalking horse.
Back in January we wrote about a potential deal between Türkiye and US over the “Kurdish question” and the lifting of an unofficial military tech embargo on Türkiye. That has been steadily progressing as restrictions are eased on Ankara and as the US encouraged its Syrian Kurdish proxies to ink a deal with the Al Qaeda government in Damascus. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, whose government plays a major role in Damascus, backed the deal.
Turkic peoples, including Azerbaijanis, make up roughly 20 percent of the population in Iran, and in the country’s West Azerbaijan and East Azerbaijan Provinces the population is mostly Azeris and Kurds. Baku makes some noise about self-determination there, but American neocons especially dream of using the Azeris and Kurds to destabilize Iran.
The wiser play for Türkiye would likely be something along the lines of the following (courtesy of The Century Foundation):
Türkiye, for example, has emerged as the new dominant force in Syria. Ankara could now serve as a vital conduit, facilitating Moscow and Tehran’s efforts to reconnect with Damascus. Meanwhile, with Turkish allies in charge in Syria, Türkiye’s dependence on both Iran and Russia has waned considerably. Yet Ankara is likely to navigate these waters with care, avoiding outright provocation of Russia and Iran. This carefulness may involve granting Iran’s allies limited room to maneuver—so long as Turkish economic interests remain firmly protected, especially its desire to monopolize regional energy transit routes bridging the Middle East and Europe.
But that take doesn’t take into account how Erdogan bit off more than he can chew in Syria, as well as the expansionary fanatics in Türkiye that were empowered in recent Turkish elections are people Erdogan needs to keep happy.
In elections of 2018 and 2023 the biggest winners were the Islamist nationalists who believe in Turkish superiority. The Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and the Iyi party took 21 percent of the vote and won 92 seats in parliament in 2018. Anti-refugee sentiment and economic hardships increased the vote share of Islamist ethno-nationalist parties in 2023, and they continue to have major influence on Turkish foreign policy. It’s not hard to draw a line between the history of say, the MHP, and Turkish support for extremist proxies.
The MHP was founded by Alparslan Turkes, an army colonel with links to Operation Gladio and it gathered strength with its tight relationship with right-wing paramilitaries like the Grey Wolves and Turkish organized crime in their CIA-backed battle against left-wingers, Communists, Kurdish, and Alevi organisations.
With their belief in Turkish superiority and their goal to rule the Arab world, these forces are in many ways the flip side to the same coin of Zionism. They are now emboldened and looking for more.
With their interests increasingly aligned with those of Washington which is in a transactional mood with Erdogan, it wouldn’t be surprising to see Türkiye try to make more moves to expand its influence to the detriment of Iran.
