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Assisted Reproduction Statute, Not Parent-Child Relationship
Statute, Governs Issue of Paternity When Pregnancy Results from
Artificial Insemination
In In re J.M., 2023 IL App (4th) 220537, a factually
complex case, a same-sex female couple used the sperm of a male
friend to conceive a child. No written legal agreement between the
couple and the sperm donor was executed regarding the sperm
donor’s intentions for paternal rights, although the evidence
presented confirmed that the sperm donor had no desires or
intentions to have any parental rights with respect to the child.
During corollary proceedings to adjudicate the minor child as
neglected, the guardian ad litem filed a petition to declare the
nonexistence of a parent-child relationship (disestablishment
petition) under §204(a)(1) of the Illinois Parentage Act of
2015, 750 ILCS 46/101, et seq. The GAL sought to rebut the
presumption that the biological mother’s wife was the
child’s “parent” when a DNA test confirmed who the
biological father of the child was. The trial court denied the
petition, and the appellate court affirmed. The issue before the
court was whether the parent-child relationship statute (Article 2
of the Parentage Act) or the assisted reproduction statute (Article
7 of the Act) governed the paternity of the child. Section
201(a)(1) of the Parentage Act presumes that the spouse of the
biological mother is the other parent if the parties are married at
the time the child is born, but such a presumption can be rebutted
with DNA evidence. However, the mother’s wife argued correctly
that the parent-child relationship in this case was governed by the
assisted reproduction statute under §103(d) of the Act, 750
ILCS 46/103(d), because “assisted reproduction” means
artificial insemination and does not include any pregnancy achieved
through sexual intercourse. Under §703(a) of the Act, 750 ILCS
46/703(a), any individual who is an “intended parent” is
the “legal parent” of any child resulting from assisted
reproduction. Further, if the donor and the intended parents do not
have a written agreement in which the donor relinquishes all rights
to the resulting child, the court shall determine parentage based
on the evidence of the parties’ intent at the time of the
donation. Therefore, the GAL failed to overcome the presumption
that the biological mother’s wife was the child’s parent
when she was his intended parent under the assisted reproduction
statute.
Trial Court’s Ruling That Sperm Donor Did Not Intend To Be
“Parent” Affirmed Despite No Written Agreement Between
Donor and Intended Parents
At hearing on the GAL’s disestablishment of paternity
petition, the GAL argued (1) that the trial court had no evidence
of the sperm donor’s intentions at the time the insemination
occurred since there was no written agreement with the intended
parents and (2) that the donor’s participation in the court
proceedings never showed an intention to not be a father. J.M.,
supra. The trial court disagreed, and the appellate court
affirmed. The biological mother’s wife made a proffer, which
both parties accepted at the hearing, that there was no intention
between the three parties that the donor was to be a parent and
that the legally married couple’s intention was to have a child
of their own. Further, nothing with respect to the donor’s
behavior contradicted the evidence as he submitted to DNA testing
only in response to a court order for him to do so and only after
he was held in contempt of court for not complying. After he was
found to be the biological father of the child as a result of the
DNA test, he surrendered his parental rights in open court. The
trial court correctly determined parentage of the child in question
under the assisted reproduction statute that the donor did not
intend to be a parent and the legal parents of the child were the
married couple who intended to be parents of the child.
Postjudgment Allocation of Stock Options Pursuant To
Undisclosed Asset Provision of MSA Upheld
In In re Marriage of Hyman, 2023 IL App (2d) 220041, a
postjudgment matter, the wife sought the allocation of stock
options received by the husband during the marriage but not
disclosed in the marital settlement agreement (MSA) pursuant to an
undisclosed asset provision set forth in the MSA. During the
dissolution proceedings, the husband activated a dormant limited
liability company (LLC) entity and entered into a contract with a
third party for consulting services for which he was compensated
only in the form of stock options. The option agreement was
executed in the husband’s name individually, rather than that
of the LLC. By the time judgment was entered, 160 of the options
had vested. Formal discovery was ongoing in the matter at the time
settlement discussions ensued but was not completed. Included in
the language of the MSA was that both parties had fully disclosed
all of their assets (with an attached balance sheet) and an
undisclosed asset provision that provided that if there were
marital assets discovered and not otherwise disclosed, they would
be divided 50-50. The wife subsequently filed a petition for
allocation of the undisclosed options postjudgment, and the trial
court ordered that all options awarded during the marriage were
subject to a 50-50 division. The husband appealed. In its opinion,
the appellate court relied heavily on the fact that the options
were in the husband’s individual name, not in the name of the
LLC, which was awarded to him in the MSA. In affirming the trial
court, the court distinguished In re Marriage of Goldsmith,
2011 IL App (1st) 093448, 962 N.E.2d 517, 356 Ill.Dec. 832,
which dealt with a 735 ILCS 5/2-1401 motion alleging that the
husband had concealed assets in an attempt to vacate a judgment.
2023 IL App (2d) 220041 at ¶18. A §2-1401 motion is based
on newly discovered evidence and an inquiry of whether due
diligence had been exercised at the time the judgment was
originally entered by the petitioning party. By contrast, in this
case, due diligence on the wife’s part was not required to be
shown because she did not seek to reopen judgment. She merely
petitioned the court to enforce the MSA and the undisclosed asset
provision.
Barring of Presettlement Negotiation Evidence Regarding
Disposition of Business Entity in Postjudgment Hearing To Allocate
Undisclosed Asset Affirmed
In a postjudgment hearing regarding whether an asset was
undisclosed in the MSA, the husband sought to introduce evidence as
to the settlement negotiations leading up to the entry of judgment.
Hyman, supra. Such settlement negotiations concerned the
disposition and allocation of a business entity awarded to the
husband in the MSA. However, because the stock options in question
at the postjudgment hearing were owned not by the aforementioned
business but instead by the husband outright, the trial court
properly barred such settlement negotiations. The trial court
correctly identified the sole issue as whether the options had
actually been disclosed. Discussions about negotiations regarding a
business were irrelevant to whether the husband had told anyone
about stock options he owned outright at the time of entry of
judgment. Since the trial court found the options were not
disclosed, there was no error in a postjudgment proceeding in the
exclusion of evidence relating to prejudgment discussions.
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