Abstract
The credibility of a jurisdiction in having an
arbitration-friendly regime is primarily based upon its enforcement
mechanism because the greater is the efficiency of the mechanism,
the higher is the success rate of enforcement. The efficacy of
enforcement mechanism is directly affected by the judicial
consistency in enforcing the foreign arbitral awards as it must
have clearly defined enforcement regime so that there is no room
for non-uniform application or exercise of judicial discretion. The
article attempts to provide a comparative analysis of the
enforcement regime of two hubs of foreign investments: India and
China and to determine the difference in their judicial attitude
and legal mechanism in order to evaluate which provides a more
pro-enforcement approach to foreign awards. The author has strictly
restricted the scope of the study to enforcement of foreign awards
and highlighting the trend in India and China. Further, the author
has delimited the scope to analysis of legal structure and
examination of judicial attitude in respect of “public
policy” ground. The article also presents the data collected
from secondary sources for substantiating the proactive role of
nations in enforcement process and finally, after making a critical
evaluation of the study, concludes with the result of the
study.
Keywords: India, China, Foreign
Awards, Enforcement regime, Judicial Attitude, and Public
Policy.
Behind the Veil of India’s Mechanism for Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Award
In India, the execution of foreign awards is predicated on
minimal court intrusion so as to promote India’s
pro-arbitration and subsequently, build a favorable environment for
foreign investment.1 To this end, laws governing the
execution of such awards is deliberately altered in order to
restrict the spectrum of challenging grounds available to award
debtor and restricts courts from adopting a broadly construed
interpretation of those grounds. India has adopted and executed a
pro-enforcement mechanism for foreign arbitral awards by embracing
a proactive and flexible stance. In the landmark case of Govt.
of India v. Vedanta Ltd.,2 the
Supreme Court ruled unequivocally that courts should be reluctant
in not enforcing arbitral awards and should endeavor to adopt a
non-interference approach. Further, the Apex Court on various
occasion has established the affinity for more pro-enforcement
regime by explicitly stating the adoption of “minimum
judicial interference” policy and delimiting the scope
and extent of intervention only to the grounds available for its
non-enforcement under Art. 48 of the A&C Act,
1996.3
A Close Look at India’s ‘Public Policy’
Delimitation
The legislative efforts have also improved the India’s
stance regarding the execution of foreign awards. For a long time,
the Foreign Awards (Recognition and Enforcement) Act, 1961 governed
how foreign awards may be put into effect such as section 7 of the
Act provided the procedural and jurisdictional grounds for the
non-enforcement which were similar to that specified under the New
York Convention (hereinafter referred as “the
Convention”). Moreover, the current grounds under the A&C
Act 19964 are nothing but a reflection of the section 7
of the Act.
However, the legislative efforts for a pro-enforcement regime
are reflected by the enactment of the Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, 1996 where the legislature has tried to restrict the scope of
non-enforcement by providing a more restrictive application of the
public policy ground. The ground can only be invoked in certain
circumstances intended to control the discretion of judiciary while
interpreting ‘public policy’ because it was prone
to broad interpretation owing to the phrase used in sec. 7 of the
Foreign Award Act i.e., “the enforcement of the award will
be contrary to public policy”, imparting no definite
meaning to the term ‘public policy’.
However, due to the subjective interpretation of ‘public
policy’5 phrase in the initial period by
courts, the legislature felt the need of importing a fixed meaning
to this ground so that the decision of courts in matters of
enforcement are not swayed by their personal opinion. As a
consequence of this, the legislature came out with 2015 Amendment
which restricted the exercise of discretion by Indian courts and
conferred a new rigid application to this ground. The 2015
Amendment was brought to Article 48 (2) of the 1996 A&C Act
which appended a clarification to the meaning of ‘public
policy’ and explicitly provided the circumstances where it
will lead to non-enforcement such as when the award is vitiated by
“fraud or corruption”, violates the
“fundamental policy of Indian law” or is against
the basic tenets of “morality and
justice”.6 Thus, the 2015 Amendment was a
major step in providing clarification to the public policy ground
so that it can be interpreted in a restricted sense7 by
the Indian courts and also, in order to achieve a uniform
application by courts.
No stamping of Foreign Award: An attribute of
Pro-Enforcement Attitude
To further ease out the process of enforcement, the Apex Court
of India held in M/s. Shri Ram Ltd.
case,8 that the foreign awards are
not necessarily required to be stamped. Thus, a foreign award will
be valid for enforcement even if it is unstamped. A similar view
was held in relation to registration of foreign award where the
court held that it is not necessary to register the foreign award
as it is liable to be enforced as decree of the
court.9
Therefore, India has embraced a “pro-enforcement bias”
towards foreign awards which is reflected in its judicial decisions
as well as in its legislative efforts with the introduction of 2015
Amendment.
An In-depth Analysis of China’s Enforcement Regime from the
lens of legislative framework
From the time when there has been a spectacular rise in Chinese
economy, a great length has been written about the Chinese legal
system and some of which brings an unfavorable light to China. When
the concern is about Chinese legal system, a great part of the
criticism has been inflicted upon the Chinese law of Arbitration
and notably, the execution of foreign arbitral award in alignment
with the scheme of the Convention. In the preceding years, numerous
studies have been undertaken by US scholars where they have
discussed and evaluated the China’s effort to enforce the
awards as per the mandate and conditions of the
Convention.10 However, as stated above, the major
criticism of Chinese legal system has not been in their favour and
casts a negative light, thus, a similar result was found in the
studies that were conducted in United States revealing that the
China’s mechanism and approach towards execution of foreign
arbitral awards has some major flaws.11
The effectiveness of China’s arbitral practices in enforcing
foreign awards in order to create a line of comparison between the
Indian and Chinese legal trends in foreign arbitral awards and
their effectiveness in enforcement is critically examined in the
following part under different heads. However, it is not based on
the presumption of the earlier study’s conclusions; rather, it
aims to analyze the statement of problem with respect to
China’s regime for execution of foreign arbitral award from a
non-presumptive perspective and assess whether the situation in
China is same as that concluded by US commentators12 or
it has a different side to it.
China’s Governing law for Enforcement of Foreign
Awards
China’s legal regime creates a demarcation among the
arbitral awards and sets out different laws and procedures for
their enforcement which superficially favours the execution of
foreign award. There are three kinds of arbitral award:
domestic13, foreign-related14 and foreign
arbitral award15. Art. 269 of the Civil Procedure Law
(hereinafter referred as “the CPL”) provides for the
recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral award by
people’s court and directs the foreign party:
“…directly apply to the intermediate people’s
court in the place where the party subject to execution has its
domicile or where its property is located. The people’s court
shall deal with the matter in accordance with the relevant
provisions of the international treaties concluded or acceded to by
the People’s Republic of China or under the principle of
reciprocity”.16
Thus, Art. 269 only specifies the jurisdiction of the court to
which a foreign party must approach for such enforcement whereas
Art. 283 merely provides that the enforcement of foreign awards can
be denied on the grounds that are listed under Article V of the New
York Convention. On the other hand, if we see this in actual
practice, the enforcement is majorly governed by:
the Convention to which China acceded in
198717,
the Supreme People’s Court notice (the SPC
notice)18 that provides for the implementation of the NY
Convention and China’s obligations towards it and;
the domestic Arbitration Law of China.19
Art. 71 of the Arbitration law enumerates the grounds for
non-enforcement which is same as provided in Article V of the
Convention while Art. 283 of the CPL provides that the courts may
deny execution on the grounds listed in Article V. But the core of
the enforcement lies in Art. 277 of the CPL where the grounds are
specifically provided (as in incorporation in domestic law:
“dualist approach”) with a slight modification in one
ground where it has replaced the words ‘public
policy’ as provided in the Convention with the words
‘social and public interest’. Thus, there is no
such phrase as public policy in China’s domestic
law.20
Furthermore, the grounds mentioned in Art. V of the NYC are
categorized into two heads which are procedural matters and
jurisdictional matters. Procedural matters as mentioned under Art.
V (1) include the following:
Validity of the arbitration agreement21;
Proper notice of arbitration proceedings was given to the other
party22;
Scope of arbitration i.e., if the issues fell outside the term
of reference of tribunal23;
Composition of the tribunal and arbitral
procedure24;
Binding award.25
While the jurisdictional matters under Art. V (2) include the
following:
Arbitrability of the subject matter26;
Social and public interest ground.27
In case of the grounds covered under procedural matters, the
courts do not have the power to deny the execution unless the
defect in procedure or the ground is taken by the contending party
explicitly. On the other hand, the Court has the discretion to deny
the execution in case it’s a ground of jurisdictional matter
even if the party has not raised this issue. Therefore, this
bifurcation is reflective of the relaxed attitude towards
enforcement of awards since it has a low threshold for
non-enforcement in jurisdictional matters only i.e., only in
jurisdictional cases, the courts can strictly deny the enforcement
and are bound to enforce it even if there is procedural flaw, but
it has not been pleaded by the other party. Moreover, it can be
observed that Art. 71 of the Arbitration Law, Art. 283 of the CPL
and Article 4 of the SPC specify that the courts “may
refuse the enforcement” implying that the courts are not
bound to strictly follow the grounds as specified and may allow the
enforcement in some of the matters which does not go to the root of
the subject matter or if allowed, it will not lead to miscarriage
of justice.
Thus, it can be presumed that China’s legislative framework
is created on the line of pro-enforcement regime facilitating a
broad enforcement policy towards such awards but before coming to
any conclusions, it is necessary to evaluate the actual reality of
enforcement which lies in the hands of judiciary.
Enforcement Strategies of India and China: A Comparative
Study
Judicial Attitude Towards ‘Public Policy’
Ground
CHINA
Chinese law construes the term ‘public policy’
as “public and social interest” which has a
wider scope of meaning attached to it and this “public and
social interest” criteria is assessed by employing its
domestic standard that is construed as the fundamental public and
social interest i.e., the basic legal and moral principles of
China. Public policy ground is interpreted broadly in China.
However, the major concern is what does “social and public
interest” imply? In order to comprehend the meaning
imported by the term, it is important to look at the judicial
interpretation of this term and their approach while denying the
enforcement of awards with the help of case laws.
In TCL Air-Conditioner (Zhongsham) Ltd. v. Castel
Electronics Pty Limited28, the SPC recorded that
the following will amount to violation of public social
interest:
Breach of the basic principle
Violation of public policy
Infringement of national sovereignty
Jeopardizing public security
Other circumstances
Further, in Hemofarm D.D. et. al v. Jinan Yonging
Pharmaceutical29, it was held that when a Chinese
court has already decided upon the issues which were dealt by the
foreign arbitral award, but the decision reached in award is
contravening to what has been laid down by the Chinese court, then
in such cases, the inconsistency of the award with the judgement
passed in domestic court will be a breach of Chinese judicial
sovereignty and thus, is in contravention to its public policy.
Contrarily, if the judgement was delivered after the issue of
award, it will not be repugnant to the judgement at the time of its
enforcement and thus, it cannot be considered as violative of
public policy ground.
The tendency of the courts to protect local party is also a
concern where the courts are applying this ground in order to
provide local protectionism and this is evidencable in the case of
Dongfeng Garments Factory of Kai Feng City and Taichun
International Trade (HK) Co. Ltd. v. Henan Garments Import &
Export (Group) Co. (1992) case30. In this matter,
the IPC opined that enforcing a foreign award which is in favour of
the foreign party is contrary to the interest of the local Chinese
party and thus, will be treated as a contravention of public and
social interest. The Court recorded that the local party was liable
to pay damages to the foreign party, still it denied the
enforcement of the foreign award because according to it, directing
the local party to pay the monetary damages will lead to a
consequential impact on the local economy and thus, is a ground of
public and social interest.31
The interpretation of the term “public social
interest” is thus, very broad and is also inclusive of
the public policy ground which in itself would have had a narrow
meaning if it was incorporated verbatim from the NY Convention. It
entails that the Chinese courts have been conferred with greater
degree of discretion while exercising the jurisdiction for
enforcement and this unbridled discretion in having no fixed
construction and meaning of the phrase would be detriment of the
interest of foreign party. However, in India, the situation is
quiet opposite as India’s judicial attitude towards the ground
of public policy follows a strict narrow construction when it comes
to execution of foreign awards32 as observed in Shri
Lal Mahal Ltd. v. Progettograno Spa.33 The
interpretation of “public policy” in case of domestic
arbitral award34 is comparative wider than that rendered
under the enforcement of foreign awards.35
Further, the courts in China have the tendency to reject the
enforcement in order to protect their domestic industries
(especially state-owned enterprises i.e., local protectionism) and
creates a certain kind of bias against a foreign
party.36 Thus, in light of the cases discussed, it can
be deduced that public policy ground does not have uniform
application in Chinese courts and is applied, according to their
local interests and personal opinion. It is quiet contrary that
though China has been serving as one of the destinations for huge
foreign investments, it has not reformed its judicial attitude in
consonance with the foreign party’s interest so that it can
increase their confidence to invest in their local industries by
providing an impartial mechanism for enforcing the foreign arbitral
award.
However, the data collected on rejection of enforcement presents
a different view as there are very few cases where the courts have
denied the enforcement by relying upon this ground.37
This ground is rarely invoked in China which in turn, implies that
China has not expanded its approach for non-enforcement. In ED
& F Man (HK) Co. Ltd. v. China National Sugar Wines Group
Co.38 and Mitsui Corp. (Japan) v. Hainan
Textile Industry General Corp.39, the court clearly
declared that infringement of domestic law i.e., Chinese law will
not be necessarily treated as a violation of public social
interest. This judgment is quiet contrary to what was laid down in
Hemofarm case40 because in that, the court had
held that it would amount to breach of public policy if the award
passed is in contravention of the reasoning laid down by Chinese
court; thus, giving supremacy to judicial sovereignty while if it
is inconsistent with the domestic laws, it will not be treated as a
ground. Thus, there is no doubt that the analysis of the courts is
flawed and is generally guided by their whims and fancies as there
is no strict rule that delimits the scope of use of this ground.
However, in GRD Minproc Ltd. v. Shanghai Feilun Industrial
Co.41, it was held that the question whether an
award was fair and just on its merits cannot be assessed while
taking the ground of public and social interest while in
Tianrui Hotel Investment Co. Ltd. v. Hangzhou Yiju Hotel
Management Co.42, it was opined that breach of
rules on franchise industry entry restriction doesn’t imply the
infringement of social and public interest.
INDIA
India’s judicial system has been making developments over
the last decade to bring into line with the international practices
for enforcing foreign awards. From the Apex Court’s judgment in
Renusagar case,43it is
evidencable that the judiciary’s prime concern is always to
adopt pro-enforcement bias and prefer a narrow construction if
possible. In this case, the court opined that the phrase
“fundamental policy of Indian law” will mean
those legal principles which are so basic and essential to Indian
legal system that their breach is not acceptable at any costs
because these principles form the bedrock of our legal structure.
Thus, it was held that breach of any legislative provision cannot
be considered as a breach of “fundamental
policy” of Indian law. The decision of Indian Judiciary
was based on the rationale that conferring a wider ambit to this
ground will lead to its misuse to delay and forego the execution.
Further, in Ssanyong Engineering & Construction Co. Ltd. v.
NHAI,44 the Supreme Court held that the ground of
justice and morality can only be invoked only in rare circumstances
where such violation has led to miscarriage of justice and has
appalled the shocked the conscience of the court.
However, the courts have blurred the demarcation of public
policy ground by allowing the review of the award on merits while
examining enforcement application, setting aside the award on
ground of public policy45 and importing a wider meaning
to ‘public policy’ as that rendered in domestic
award. The approach was later corrected by the court in Bharat
Aluminium Co. v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services
Inc.46and Shri Lal Mahal Ltd.
case47 where it was observed that
review on merits is not a ground of challenge for enforcement.
Thus, India has settled its position with respect to public policy
ground that the courts are not expected to interfere with the
subject matter of the award because the merits have been already
examined, discussed and decided by another court, the role of
Indian courts is only to enforce the awards. Further, the ground of
public policy is not subject to various interpretations as it is
settled it means the basic principles of our legal system that
cannot be compromised at any cost. Thus, India has aligned its
interpretation with the intent and objective of the NY
Convention.
China’s Automatic System of Appeal: A Positive
Aspect
Chinese Arbitration law provides a different mechanism that is
generally not followed in India so as to ensure the monitoring of
lower courts i.e., IPC while they exercise this jurisdiction.
China’s separate mechanism called “Supervisory
Reporting System” is reflective of the China’s
solicitude for enforcement of such awards. Art. 2 of the SPC
provides that in matters related to “foreign-related
arbitration” and “foreign
arbitration”, where the Intermediate People’s Court
(IPC) is of the decision to refuse the enforcement, then it cannot
be implemented unless the decision for not to enforce is reviewed
by the Higher People’s Court and if the latter is also of the
same opinion, the decision will be further reviewed by the SPC.
Further, this mechanism has centralized the judicial review in the
highest judicial body as the decision of non-enforcement will
always be rendered by the highest judicial body i.e., the SPC,
unlike in India as we have no such double scrutiny mechanism for
enforcing such awards. In a study, it was found that out of the 48
cases which case for review of the SPC under Reporting System, the
court allowed the refusal in 21 cases.48 Thus, this
procedural system ensures a double scrutiny of the decision to
refuse to enforce and thus, is significant of the pro-active role
of Chinese courts in matters of foreign award enforcement and how
they act with caution before passing a decision of non-enforcement
by providing a safety valve in order to prevent the miscarriage of
justice to the parties.
Limitation Period: India v. China
Art. III of the Convention is silent upon the issue of
limitation period. Courts have determined that limitation periods
for seeking the recognition and execution of foreign awards have
been ruled to be procedural rules subject to the competent
state’s domestic law. Therefore, this will usually be
determined according to the law of the place of enforcement. Thus,
the limitation period for enforcing is significant to be considered
because it will clearly have a significant impact on the
enforcement at the outset.
India and China have applied limitation periods found in their
domestic procedural rule pursuant to Art. III of the Convention. In
India, there was ambiguity in determining the limitation period for
the enforcement because the earlier rule was that it would be in
accordance with Art. 136 of the Limitation Act read with sec. 49 of
the A&C Act, 1996, which stipulated that a foreign award would
be enforced as a court decree, and thus, the limitation period
generally followed by the Indian Judiciary was 12 years. In the
case of Vedanta Ltd.49, the
Indian courts developed a pro-enforcement bias approach, holding
that the applicability of Art. 136 is immaterial to the matter of
enforcement of foreign awards and that the term of limitation is
governed by Art. 137 of the Limitation Act. Therefore, the party
will have 3 years to enforce the award. This decision was a
significant turning point in Indian arbitration law since it
ensured a flawless enforcement mechanism by closing loopholes in
the domestic legal system.
However, in China the limitation period for enforcement of
foreign award is provided under Art. 239 of the CPL as clarified in
the SPC i.e., the limitation period is of two years.50
Further, it provides that it shall commence from the last day of
the period mentioned in the legal document and if it is to be to be
enforced in stages, then from the last day of last enforcement
stage period.51 The approach of Chinese courts is that
the limitation period will commence from the day when the assets of
the award debtor for enforcement in China, are discovered by the
award creditor i.e. when the jurisdiction of the court for
enforcement is approved.52 Furthermore, the Chinese law
provides for suspension of limitation period under Art. 239 of the
CPL when the Applicant withdraws the enforcement
application.53
Concluding Remarks
Following a pro-enforcement approach for countries like India
and China is quiet significant owing to the fact that they are one
of the biggest hubs for foreign investments; thus, it becomes more
crucial for such nations to adopt a pro-foreign investment approach
by minimizing the interference with the enforcement mechanism. In
light of the discussion above, it is deduced that India has adopted
the enforcement mechanism with a more positive attitude keeping in
mind the interest of foreign investors and also in order to provide
a more effective and easy procedure of mechanism with less judicial
intervention; thus, removing the legislative hurdles for foreign
investment. It shows that India respects the finality of foreign
awards by minimizing the impediments in its enforcement. Further,
over the last decade of years, India has reshaped and aligned the
judicial attitude with landmark judgments so that the ground of
“public policy” is not misused. On the other
hand, China also proves to be pro-active in enforcement mechanism,
but it does have some shortcomings such as the non-uniform
application of “public social interest” since
greater degree of discretion conferred upon the Chinese judiciary
while exercising jurisdiction on enforcement application though it
has decided for non-enforcement in very few cases. However, China
also has a positive side to enforcement mechanism like the
Supervisory reporting mechanism which ensures that the decision of
non-enforcement is an outcome of the deliberation of highest
judicial body. Thus, the study concludes that China is not as
pro-active as India but still its enforcement rate of foreign award
cannot be ignored keeping in mind its judicial developments and the
legal framework.
Footnotes
1. NTT Docomo Inc. v. Tata Sons Ltd. 2017 SCC
OnLine Del 8078; Khaitan & Co., ‘Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards and Scope of Judicial Intervention: A Minimalist
Approach’ (Lexology, 2 July 2020) (https://www.lexology.com/commentary/arbitration-adr/india/khaitan-co/enforcement-of-foreign-arbitral-awards-and-scope-of-judicial-intervention-a-minimalist-approach)
accessed on 12 February 2023.
2. (2020) 10 SCC 1.
3. Vijay Karia v. Prysmian Cavi E Sistemi SRL (2020) 11
SCC 1.
4. The Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996, Art.
48.
5. The Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996, Art. 48
(2).
6. The Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996.,
Art. 48 (2) Explanation I.
7. Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v. General Electric Co.
(1994) Supp (1) SCC 644.
8. Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v. General Electric Co.
(1994) Supp (1) SCC 644.
9. Naval Gent Maritime Ltd. v. Shivnath Rai Harnarain (I)
Ltd. (2009) 174 DLT 391.
10. Xiaowen Qiu, ‘Enforcing Arbitral Awards Involving
Foreign Parties: A comparison of the United States and China’
(2000) 11 Am. Rev. Int’l Arb. 607; Fiona D’souza, ‘The
Recognition and Enforcement of Commercial Arbitral Awards in the
People’s Republic of China’ (2007) 30 Fordham Int’l
L.J. 1318.
11. Randall Peerenboom, ‘Seek Truth from acts: An
Empirical Study of the Enforcement of Arbitral Awards in the
PRC’ (2001) 49 Am. J. Comp. L. 249, 253-255; Manjiao Chi,
‘Time to make a Change? A comparative Study of Chinese
Arbitration Law and the 2006 UNICTRAL Model Law and the Forecast of
Chinese Arbitration Law Reform’ (2009) 5 Asian Int’l Arb.
J. 142; Christopher Hen, ‘International Arbitration and
Enforcement in China: Historical Perspectives and Current
Trends’ (2005) 14 Currents: Int’l Trade L.J. 69,
74-76.
12. Id.
13. The Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic
of China, Art. 217.
14. The Arbitration Law of the People’s Republic of
China, Art. 65.
15. The Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic
of China, Art. 269.
16. The Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic
of China, Art. 269.
17. Mark S. Hamilton, ‘Sailing in an Asia of
Obscurity: The Following Important of China’s Maritime
Arbitration Commission’ (2002) 3 Asia Pac. LJ 10.
18. The Supreme People’s Court Notice (hereinafter
“the SPC Notice”), Article 4.
19. The Arbitration Law of the People’s Republic of
China, Art. 71.
20. The Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic
of China, Art. 260 (2).
21. The United Nations Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York, 1958), Art. V (1)
(a).
22. The United Nations Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York, 1958), Art. V (1)
(b).
23. The United Nations Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York, 1958), Art. V (1)
(c).
24. The United Nations Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York, 1958), Art. V (1)
(d).
25. The United Nations Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York, 1958), Art. V (1)
(e); The Arbitration Law of the People’s Republic of China,
Art. 9.
26. The United Nations Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York, 1958), Art. V (2)
(a).
27. The United Nations Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York, 1958), Art. V (2)
(b); The Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China,
Art. 274
28. [2014] FCAFC 83.
29. [2008] Min Si Ta Zi No. 11.
30. Cheng Dejung et. al, ‘International Arbitration
in the PRC, in Randall Peerenboom, The Evolution Regulation
Framework for Enforcement of Arbitral Awards in the PRC’ (2000)
1 Asia Pac. Law Policy Journal 3.
31. Cheng Dejung et. al, ‘International Arbitration
in the PRC, in Randall Peerenboom, The Evolution Regulation
Framework for Enforcement of Arbitral Awards in the PRC’ (2000)
1 Asia Pac. Law Policy Journal 3.
32. The Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996, Art.
48.
33. (2014) 2 SCC 433.
34. The Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996, Art.
34.
35. The Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996, Art.
48.
36. Reger P. Alford et. al., ‘Perceptions and
Reality: The Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards in China’
(2016) 33 UCLA Pac. Basin L. J. 1, 2 (https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2372&context=faculty_scholarship);
Ellen Reinstein, ‘Finding a Happy Ending for Foreign Investors:
The Enforcement of Arbitration Awards in the People’s Republic
of China’ (2005) 16 Ind. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 37,
64.
37. Reger P. Alford et. al., ‘Perceptions and
Reality: The Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards in China’
(2016) 33 UCLA Pac. Basin L. J. 1, 22, (https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2372&context=faculty_scholarship).
38. [2003] Min Si Ta Zi No. 3.
39. [2001] Min Si Ta Zi No. 12.
40. [2008] Min Si Ta Zi No. 11.
41. [2008] Min Si Ta Zi No. 48.
42. [2010] Zhe Shang Wai Ta Zi No. 3.
43. [2010] Zhe Shang Wai Ta Zi No. 3.
44. 2019 SCC OnLine SC 677.
45. Venture Global Engineering v. Satyam Computer
Services Pvt. Ltd. 2017 SCC OnLine SC 1272.
46. (2012) 9 SCC 552.
47. (2014) 2 SCC 433.
48. Reger P. Alford et. al., ‘Perceptions and
Reality: The Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards in China’
(2016) 33 UCLA Pac. Basin L. J. 1,10 (https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2372&context=faculty_scholarship);.
49. (2020) 10 SCC 1.
50. Interpretations of the Supreme People’s Court on
the Application of the Civil Procedure Law of the People’s
Republic of China, Art. 547.
51. The Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic
of China, Art. 239.
52. Shanghai Jwell Machinery Co. Ltd. v. Retech
Aktiengesellschaft SPC Guiding Case No. 37.
53. O’Key Logistics LLC v. Guangdong SouthFortune
Import & Export Co. Ltd. [2013] Sui Zhongfa Minsi Chuzi No.
12.
Sneha is a student of Maharashtra National Law
University, Aurangabad and Winner of the Honourable Mention Prize
of the 9th Ed. of Arb Excel Essay Writing
Competition.
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