On February 13, 2025, a Tennessee federal district court handed FedEx Corporation its second win in a refund action involving the application of foreign tax credits to what are known as “offset earnings.”[1] Offset earnings are earnings from a taxpayer’s profitable related foreign corporations that are offset by losses from other related foreign corporations. FedEx previously prevailed on the question of whether it was entitled to foreign tax credits related to such earnings.[2] In this most recent ruling, the court rejected the Government’s reliance on a certain regulatory provision called the “Regulatory Haircut Rule”[3] to argue that the amount of FedEx’s claimed refund should be reduced. The case now appears to be set for appeal.
Revisiting the analysis in its first ruling, the court explained the error of the Government’s reliance upon the Regulatory Haircut Rule. In short, the court said that the rule’s application conflicted with the best construction of the governing statutes, primarily Internal Revenue Code (IRC) Sections 960, 965(b)(4), and 965(g). The Government defended its reliance by appealing to Loper Bright’s instruction that courts must respect legitimate delegations of authority to an agency.[4] Citing IRC Section 965(o), which authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to prescribe regulations “as may be necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of” Section 965 and to “prevent the avoidance of the purposes” of this section, the Government argued that the Regulatory Haircut Rule furthered the IRC’s broader goal of preventing tax avoidance and that Loper Bright required the court to respect the Secretary’s exercise of his delegated authority.
While acknowledging that legitimate delegations of authority to agencies remain permissible after Loper Bright, the court reminded the Government that an agency does not have the power to regulate in a manner that is inconsistent with the statute, even when a delegation provision grants the agency broad discretionary authority:
Assuming that Congress delegated authority . . . to promulgate regulations implementing section 965 . . . that authority cannot, under Loper Bright, encompass the discretion to promulgate regulations that contravene the “single, best meaning” of section 965, as determined by the courts.[5]
In other words, a statute’s delegation provision should not be interpreted to allow Treasury to eliminate rules that Congress established in other parts of the IRC.
Practice Point: Referencing Loper Bright’s acknowledgment that Congress may “confer discretionary authority on agencies,”[6] the Government has defended (and likely will continue to defend) its regulations on the theory that its exercises of such authority should be respected. But as Loper Bright reminds us, courts have an independent duty to decide the meaning of statutory delegations. Thus, taxpayers should closely examine whether regulations purportedly derived from a statute’s delegation provision comport with the rest of the statute. Those that do not should be challenged.
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[1] FedEx Corp. & Subs. v. United States, No. 2:20-cv-02794 (W.D. Tenn., Feb. 13, 2025)(electronically available here).
[2] FedEx Corp. & Subs v. United States, No. 2:20-cv-02794 (W.D. Tenn., Mar. 31, 2023)(electronically available here).
[3] See Treas. Reg. § 1.965-5(c)(1)(i) (limiting foreign tax credits by the amount of withholding taxes paid to a foreign jurisdiction). The court also rejected the Government’s reliance upon what it called the “Statutory Haircut Rule” based on IRC section 965(g)(1). This discussion focuses on the regulatory counterpart.
[4] See Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 144 S.Ct. 2244, 2268 (2024).
[5] FedEx, No. 2:20-cv-02794 (W.D. Tenn., Feb. 13, 2025).
[6] Loper Bright, 144 S.Ct. at 2268.
