Israel’s State Commission of Inquiry into the submarines and vessels procurement affair, headed by former Supreme Court President Justice Asher Grunis, today published its findings and recommendations on the systematic failings that were uncovered in the probe of the affair.
The Commission found that “for years, governments have avoided setting a clear policy that would hold them accountable, leaving the Ministry of Defense in limbo. Instead of setting a policy and strategy, governments have made specific decisions and ignored the overall picture of defense needs in a way that jeopardized state security.”
The Grunis Commission also found “Systemic failings that go to the roots of the security forces building processes and decision-making in defense procurement, at a cost of billions of shekels, and in other sensitive security-political processes, which concern Israel’s conduct on the issue of the sale of weapons by Germany to a third party.”
The Commission found, “The handling of the issue of the sale of weapons by allies to third parties – a sensitive strategic issue – was conducted chaotically and without a guiding hand, in a way that jeopardized the security of the state.”
The Commission’s report sharply criticizes some of the bodies that took part in shaping the policy. According to the Commission, the National Security Committee, “Failed in its duties and exceeded its authority,” and the Navy “exceeded accepted norms of conduct in all matters relating to procurement and equipment. The Navy coordinated positions with commercial enterprises, presented manipulative data to decision-makers, and officers in the Navy conducted contacts with the political echelon in violation of army orders.”
“An opportunity to learn lessons”
The Grunis Commission was established in 2022 following revelations about irregularities in Israel’s procurement of submarines and vessels from German company ThyssenKrupp for billions of euros.
In June 2024, the committee sent warning letters to senior officials, including Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Regarding Netanyahu, the Commission found that “his conduct on the issues investigated by the committee led to a deep and systematic disruption of work processes and military force building, and damage to decision-making mechanisms on a number of sensitive issues. In doing so, he jeopardized the security of the state and harmed the foreign relations and economic interests of the State of Israel.”
The Commission also sent warning letters to former Mossad head Yossi Cohen; former Minister of Defense Moshe Ya’alon, former Navy Commander Admiral Ram Rothberg; and former National Security Staff (NSS) employee Avner Simhoni.
The report published by the Commission today does not deal with the personal warnings, which are pending in the High Court of Justice in light of a petition filed by Netanyahu and others warned demanding a delay in the final findings in their case, but rather with systemic matters.
In terms of recommendations, the Grunis Commission set that “These days, major decisions are being made on force building and procurement, and decisions by allies regarding the sale of strategic weapons to third parties – decisions that will affect the readiness of the army and the Israeli economy for many years. There is an urgency and an opportunity to draw lessons and correct the failures found.”
The Commission added, “The decisions by the political echelon must be made after an orderly process, in which professional elements take part, and all considerations – political and professional – are taken into account. Only in this way can it be ensured that the decisions are made in accordance with security needs and to prevent involving of external considerations. This was not the case in the vessel cases.”
The Commission also recommended, “A binding procedure for force building, in which the government sets priorities and manages security risks. The government will rank the threats for which the IDF must prepare, and the IDF will formulate a multi-year plan accordingly. The military branches will vote on their requirements, the IDF Planning Department will examine the requirements from a comprehensive perspective of the military’s needs and bring the proposal to the General Staff. The process will require continuous dialogue between the military and political echelon, and it will be mandatory to submit the multi-year plan for government approval.”
Criticism of the cabinet and Ministry of Defense
The political-security cabinet was also criticized in the Commission’s report. “Despite its responsibility, the cabinet does not shape force building. Cabinet members told the Commission that they were a ‘rubber stamp’ for decisions made by the Ministry of Defense,” the Commission found.
Consequently, it recommended setting up a permanent committee that would advise the political echelon on the issue of force building and would consist of professionals appointed by the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defense, and the Minister of Finance. The committee’s role would be “to challenge the positions of the Ministry of Defense – a role in which the National Security Council failed.”
On the Ministry of Defense, the Grunis Committee found, “There is no professional body in the Ministry of Defense responsible for force building policy. In fact, the Ministry of Defense implements decisions formulated in the IDF. In order for the Ministry of Defense to be able to fulfill its mission, the Commission recommends that the IDF Planning Division become a joint body of the Ministry of Defense and the IDF (similar to the IDF Planning and Economic Advisor to the Chief of Staff, who heads the Finance Division in the Ministry of Defense). This body will serve as a professional headquarters on the issue of force building.”
Due to the confusion that the Commission found in the arms sales process, it recommended, “Establishing a process that will ensure that Israeli policy is formulated after the positions of the professional bodies, including the IDF, have been heard, and that the State of Israel speaks with one voice. The Commission found that conversations and summaries with foreign bodies were not documented. The Commission considers it appropriate to note that representatives of the State of Israel, including ministers and prime ministers, are responsible for documenting their contacts with foreign bodies and distributing them to the relevant bodies.”
On the National Security Council, the Commission found, “The head of the National Security Council and National Security Council employees are not permitted to engage in the implementation of decisions made, including engaging in procurement or managing relations with commercial entities.”
The serious findings regarding the Navy led the Commission to recommend to the Chief of Staff to investigate the “organizational culture and procurement processes” in the Navy, and even to update orders on contacts between officers in the army and the political echelon.
Several senior officials have already been indicted
According to the investigation published by Channel 13 journalist Raviv Drucker, which led to the revelations in the affair, Israel procured three submarines from the ThyssenKrupp corporation for €1.5 billion, and also entered into a deal with the company to procure missile vessels to protect gas rigs for €430 million.
Following the affair, an investigation was opened known as “Case 3000,” but then Attorney General Dr. Avichai Mandelblit announced that Netanyahu was not a suspect.
Following the investigations, the Attorney General’s Office filed indictments against several senior officials, who were charged with promoting the contract with ThyssenKrupp in exchange for bribes. Among the senior officials charged are businessman and ThyssenKrupp representative in Israel, Miki Ganor; former Deputy Head of the National Security Council, Avriel Bar-Yosef; and former Prime Minister’s Office Director, David Sharan.
Presumption of innocence: Miki Ganor, Avriel Bar-Yosef and David Sharan have not been convicted of any crime and must be presumed innocent.
Published by Globes, Israel business news – en.globes.co.il – on January 25, 2026.
© Copyright of Globes Publisher Itonut (1983) Ltd., 2026.
