Self-defense and gun ownership are constantly being attacked in modern discourse and by the mainstream media, yet their legitimacy rests on principles far older than any constitution, preceding and transcending any political framework. The importance of self-defense lies in its role as a safeguard against both private and state aggression. Unlike modern states, which increasingly disarm their citizens and leave them defenseless, a private-law society would place no restrictions on the individual ownership of firearms or other weapons. In a genuinely free society, the preservation of liberty does not depend on armies or governments but on morally responsible individuals capable of self-reliance. Security must never be entrusted to the very institution that holds the monopoly on force; it must remain in the hands of the people themselves.
The School of Salamanca—a group of 16th-century theologians and jurists—developed a profound understanding of natural law, laying the groundwork for modern concepts of individual liberty and resistance to tyranny. Among them, Francisco de Vitoria and Francisco Suárez affirmed self-defense as an inalienable right, grounded in divine natural law and applicable to individuals and communities, including cases of resistance to oppressive authorities. It is fundamental to emphasize that the Salamanca scholastics did not create natural law, but rather understood and articulated it.
Natural law, being intrinsically linked to human nature, is not a historical invention or cultural construct, but rather a discovery of universal and timeless principles. According to these scholars, since human nature remains constant across time and cultures, natural law has always been valid and always will be. Although Hoppe, in A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism, distances himself from how the natural rights tradition “has come to be” in its contemporary formulation, noting that his approach “owes nothing to this tradition as it stands,” he himself admits that it is possible to interpret his argumentation ethics as belonging to a “rightly conceived” natural rights tradition. Argumentation ethics may well represent the most rigorous and philosophically defensible justification for property rights, this approach arrives at the same conclusions as the Salamanca scholastics through a different, arguably more secure, path.
In their own words, as documented in The Catholic Second Amendment by David B. Kopel, Francisco de Vitoria—building on Thomas Aquinas’s framework of self-defense—differentiated between what a person “wills” and what they “intend.” For example, someone with gangrene may “will” the amputation of their arm to survive but does not “intend” the amputation itself as the primary goal. Similarly, in self-defense, a person may “will” the death of an attacker as an outcome of stopping the assault but does not “intend” it as the main objective. This right to self-defense extends to a child protecting themselves from a murderous father, a subject resisting a homicidal king (provided it does not destabilize the kingdom), and even opposing an evil pope. Francisco Suárez described self-defense as “the greatest of rights,” inherent to both individuals and communities, encompassing the right to resist tyrants.
Suárez further clarified that self-defense does not depend only on external property ownership, noting that even Franciscan monks—who forgo material possessions—have a natural right to defend their bodies and the items they use. The idea of Suárez resonates deeply with the concept of “self-ownership” outlined by Murray Rothbard. In works such as The Ethics of Liberty, Rothbard argues that every individual is the absolute owner of their own body, which forms the ethical foundation of all property rights. In the same work, Rothbard conceives of property rights as necessarily encompassing the authority to defend them:
If every man has the absolute right to his justly-held property, it then follows that he has the right to keep that property—to defend it by violence against violent invasion…. To say that someone has the absolute right to a certain property but lacks the right to defend it against attack or invasion is also to say that he does not have total right to that property.
Kinsella, in Legal Foundations of a Free Society, argues that our rights over our own bodies arise from the fact that we exercise direct and immediate control over them, following Hoppe’s reasoning. In contrast, property rights over external, previously-unowned resources emerge through original appropriation or through voluntary transfer. Because I have direct control over my body, I have a stronger and more objective claim to it than anyone else—who can, at most, exert only indirect influence. However, when a person has committed an act of aggression, he cannot consistently object to being punished, because through his act of aggression he demonstrates that he holds the view that the use of force is legitimate, and thus cannot object to force being used to punish him without falling in contradiction. Self-defense is therefore legitimate. The aggressor’s actions show he accepts force as valid, so he cannot object when force is used against him, the victim needs no further justification (of course, proportionality of retribution must be considered).
Criminal injustices on private property—such as theft, assault, or vandalism—are widely recognized as illegitimate, allowing victims to respond with force. Hoppe notes, in Democracy: The God That Failed, that:
…if violations of property rights occur and the goods appropriated or produced by A are stolen, damaged or expropriated by B, or if B restricts the uses that A is permitted to make of his goods in any way (apart from not being allowed to cause any physical damage to the property of B), then the tendency toward a fall in the rate of time preference will be disturbed, halted, or even reversed. (pp. 10-11)
These violations, he explains, come in two forms: criminal activities and institutional or governmental interference. While criminal acts are broadly seen as illegitimate, allowing victims to defend themselves, governmental violations are often perceived as legitimate, making resistance difficult.
The defining feature of private criminal invasions of property rights lies in the fact that such conduct is broadly recognized as illegitimate and unjust, not solely by the immediate victim of the aggression, but also by property owners in general across society, and in certain cases even by the perpetrator himself who—at some level—acknowledges the wrongful nature of his act. From this recognition follows the principle that the victim possesses a rightful claim to defend himself, including through the use of retaliatory force when circumstances require it, and furthermore retains the moral and legal authority to impose punishment upon the aggressor and/or to demand appropriate restitution as a means of redressing the harm suffered. The state’s monopolization of justice poses a greater threat than private criminality, because its own violations—through taxation, regulation, or expropriation—are widely regarded as lawful and legitimate carried out systematically and normalized within society, despite often being even more harmful. Hoppe writes:
The distinctive mark of government violations of private property rights is that contrary to criminal activities they are considered legitimate not only by the government agents who engage in them, but by the general public as well (and in rare instances possibly even by the victim). Hence, in these cases a victim may not legitimately defend himself against such violations. (p. 12)
By disarming citizens, the state consolidates its monopoly on force. Access to firearms facilitates not only individual self-defense but also the formation of militias—voluntary groups of armed citizens—to defend communities against criminal and state aggression. Firearms are a tool for exercising the right to self-defense, similar to how communication platforms serve as tools for exercising free speech. For example, in history, authoritarian regimes rarely ban speech outright but control access to the means. A gun represents the last line of defense against tyranny.
Finally, as Hoppe states in The Great Fiction that, unlike the prevailing statist model—which increasingly disarms citizens and leaves them vulnerable to aggressors—a private-law society would impose no limitations on the private ownership of firearms or other weapons. Every individual fundamental right to defend their life and property would be upheld without compromise. Historical evidence from the The Not So Wild, Wild West, together with numerous contemporary studies, shows that societies with greater gun ownership tend to experience lower crime rates.
In a truly free society, the preservation of liberty does not rest with armies or governments. Gun ownership signifies self-sufficiency. It is essential for individuals who take responsibility for themselves, entrusted only to those guided by moral standards. Security—far from being entrusted to the aggressor, in this case, the state—must remain in the hands of individuals.
A disarmed society is not peaceful; it is powerless. Stripping people of arms does not create security, it enforces submission. Conversely, a society of armed citizens is not dangerous, unless, of course, you happen to be a tyrant.
